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TECHNOLOGY RISKS AND LIABILITIES:
ARE YOU COVERED?
Robert M. (Randy) Roach, Jr.*
Daniel L. McKay**
INTRODUCTION
IVEN rapid transformations in the American and global econo-Gmies and the continuing shift to a service and information-based
economy dependent on technology, future insurance coverage
battles between policyholders and their insurers are likely to focus in-
creasingly on new types of first-party losses and complex third-party lia-
bility issues.' As policyholders seek to exploit new business opportunities
in cyberspace, both domestically and abroad, and as insurance carriers
also explore potential new markets, policyholders and their counsel2
* Mr. Roach is a partner and co-founder of the law firm Cook, Roach & Lawless,
L.L.P. with offices in Austin and Houston, Texas. The firm specializes in representing poli-
cyholders in complex coverage cases. He is a graduate of Georgetown University and the
University of Texas School of Law.
** Mr. McKay is an associate of Cook, Roach & Lawless, L.L.P. practicing in Hous-
ton, Texas. Mr. McKay received his B.A. and J.D. from the University of Texas at Austin.
1. This article focuses primarily on business and technology risks facing U.S. policy-
holders in their domestic operations. As U.S. firms expand overseas and engage in joint
ventures, cross-licensing agreements, and other business with foreign companies and com-
petitors, these firms inevitably will become involved in a greater number of disputes be-
tween foreign companies and licensees concerning intellectual property issues. If a
litigation matter arises with a foreign competitor, forum, venue selection, and choice-of-
law issues will be significant in resolving such litigation. See, e.g., ICT Pharm., Inc. v. Bo-
ehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 147 F.Supp.2d 268 (D. Del. 2001) (patent infringement
suit against allegedly affiliated German corporations dismissed for lack of personal juris-
diction because there was no "substantial connection" between German corporations' ac-
tivities and Delaware). See also In re Application of Ishihara Chem. Co., Ltd., 251 F. 3d
120 (2nd Cir. 2001) (case of first impression involving the issue of whether 28 U.S.C. § 1782
may be used by a Japanese company to obtain discovery from a U.S. corporation for use in
patent invalidity proceeding in Japan where the U.S. corporation was a party to the Japa-
nese proceeding and where the discovery could not be obtained under Japanese law).
Therefore, U.S. policyholders should ensure that their insurance portfolio covers events
occurring outside the United States. Furthermore, U.S. policyholders should also ensure
that in the event coverage litigation ensues, the insurance carrier will agree to be served in
the U.S. and will agree to resolve the coverage dispute in a U.S. forum applying U.S. law.
2. This article does not address ethical duties of counsel that may arise in the course
of representing intellectual property clients with potential insurance coverage issues. How-
ever, practitioners should be aware of potential liabilities for failing to properly investigate
and accurately determine whether or not insurance coverage may apply to claims being
asserted against an intellectual property client. See generally Lisa A. Dolak, As If You
Didn't Have Enough to Worry A bout: Current Ethics Issues for Intellectual Property Practi-
tioners, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 235, 259 (Apr. 2000) (discussing cases in-
volving the question of whether or not an attorney "has a duty to inquire into the
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should carefully analyze strategies of using insurance to hedge against
foreseeable and unforeseeable business risks, such as the loss of computer
data or corruption of storage networks, infringement of intellectual prop-
erty rights, the risk of attacks on computer networks, and the potential
theft of trade secrets. 3 Insurers should also investigate economically via-
ble means of spreading new and emerging risks across a diverse spectrum
of business policyholders and also reinsuring such risks where
appropriate.
This article identifies significant potential risks and liabilities facing
policyholders and analyzes whether or not insurance policies may provide
coverage for the claim at issue or a defense to the policyholder in the
event litigation is commenced against the policyholder. Section I identi-
fies general business risks and liabilities associated with conducting busi-
ness based on intellectual property, including potential liability exposure
to patent, copyright, service mark, trademark, unfair competition, Lan-
ham Act, trade dress, tortious interference of contract, and anti-trust
claims. Section II identifies business risks arising out of potential expo-
sure to invasion of privacy, libel, slander, and defamation claims. Section
III identifies risks of incurring economic losses due to loss or corruption
of computer data, network downtime, business interruptions, and similar
potential issues. Section IV identifies risks of loss of intellectual property
rights and trade secrets.
The foregoing sections primarily address five general and distinct types
of risk facing policyholders in the new millennium: (1) the risk of being
existence, nature and scope of insurance policies previously procured by the client, and to
determine whether any such policy provides the client with any entitlement in relation to
the claim being litigated."). Intellectual property law firms representing multiple technol-
ogy clients may inadvertently be exposed to conflict of interest issues following successful
litigation many years after the litigation has concluded. See, e.g., Berkeley Ltd. P'ship v.
Arnold, White & Durkee, 118 F.Supp.2d 668, 671 (D. Md. 2000) ("The present suit was
filed thirteen years after AW & D began representing plaintiff and Intel. The statute of
limitations in this case is three years. Defendant began their representation of plaintiff in
1984, and their representation of Intel in late 1984. Plaintiff's claim against IBM was set-
tled in 1988. Plaintiff argues that their claim did not begin to accrue until June 1996 when
Donald Jefferson and Arnold Berkeley allegedly had a conversation reminiscing over the
old days. Jefferson was telling Berkeley that he thought they should have gotten more out
of IBM as a result of their 1988 settlement. Jefferson expressed the opinion that had AW
& D not represented Intel, more of BLP's claims would have remained in the complaint
against IBM. Berkeley allegedly got agitated because this was the first time he had heard
that AW & D represented Intel. As a result of the conversation, plaintiff filed suit against
AW & D in 1997.") (emphasis added).
3. As the scope of the article is limited to insurance coverage issues, broader issues
concerning the Internet's impact on society have not been discussed. See generally Keith
Aoki, Considering Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertarianism, Na-
tional Sovereignty, "Global" Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LE-
GAL STUD. 443 (1998). The trend toward "globalization" in business, fostered by advances
in communications, may lead to important changes in international law. See Dan L. Burk,
Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695 (1998) (sug-
gesting changes in trademark law to adapt to new forms of global electronic commerce);
see also Paul Edward Geller, From Patchwork to Network: Strategies for International Intel-
lectual Property in Flux, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 553 (1998) (analyzing the shift from




sued by a competitor, e.g., the risk of defending a significant intellectual
property (IP) liability suit;4 (2) the risk of potential liability to business
consumers and individuals arising out of invasion of privacy, defamation,
libel, slander and similar claims; (3) the risk of incurring economic losses
due to first and third-party claims based on alleged loss or destruction of
data, inability to access data, network downtime, and similar types of
claims based on economic losses and destruction or corruption of com-
puter data; (4) the risk of loss of intellectual property rights and/or trade
secrets as a result of the wrongful acts of third parties and/or employees;
and (5) the risk of losing existing and prospective business relations be-
cause of the improper actions of competitors. 5 Most of the reported in-
surance coverage cases focus on whether or not coverage exists under the
policyholder's comprehensive general liability ("CGL") policy and more
4. This article discusses the following types of IP liability lawsuits: (1) patent infringe-
ment cases, both contributory and inducing; (2) trademark infringement cases; (3) service
mark infringement cases; (4) trade dress infringement cases; (5) misappropriation of trade
secrets cases; and (6) Lanham Act cases. For other commentators' views on emerging
coverage cases in this area, see David A. Gauntlett, Patents and Insurance: Who Will Pay
for Reimbursement?, 4 B. U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 6 (1998) (concluding that "counsel repre-
senting clients in patent infringement lawsuits should promptly tender these claims to in-
surers, who are 'at risk' from and after the date when an insured asserts a claim for
damages. Insurers will more than likely deny a defense based on pertinent case law. Nev-
ertheless, such denials may be ill-considered and do not specifically address the factual
elements necessary to prove the pertinent patent claims. Careful analysis of the claims, in
light of applicable law and the character of the proof required in the underlying patent
infringement lawsuit, may support the basis of the insured's claim against the insurer. The
rewards available to a persistent policyholder in pursuit of such claims can be significant."
See also Lisa A. Small, Offensive and Defensive Insurance Coverage for Patent Infringement
Litigation: Who Will Pay?, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 707 (1998) (discussing patent
infringement actions brought by a two-person company, Celeritas Technologies Ltd.,
against Rockwell International Corp. and AT&T, demonstrating the great burden small
companies face in defending their patent rights against larger competitors. Ms. Small con-
cludes that "because the high-tech industry continues to grow in importance to the United
States, the economy, insurers, businesses, and courts must make a strong cooperative effort
to put an end to this industry's suffering. In recognizing that patents are the lifeblood of
this industry, adequate insurance coverage must be made widely available in order to en-
sure patent security to all interested parties."). See also David Syrowik, Insurance Cover-
age for Software-Related Patent and Other Intellectual Property Disputes, 75 MICH. Bus.
L.J. 502 (1996) and Jason A. Reyes, CGL Insurance Coverage for Patent Infringement, 2
B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 14 (1996).
5. The risks facing policyholders involved in technology enterprises are very difficult
to accurately assess and quantify. One of the significant problems in pricing insurance to
protect a policyholder's intellectual property is the difficulty of accurately assessing the
risks to that "property." As noted by David N. Schachter in the Denver Business Journal,
"IP liability insurance is scarce because, unlike other areas of potential liability, it has
proven extremely difficult to apply the insurance model to the types of losses that arise
from the misuse or infringement of intellectual property rights. There are two reasons for
this. First, while it may be relatively easy to predict the types of losses that can befall
something tangible like a building or a supply of inventory, it is far more complex trying to
predict the types of perils that can arise from the misuse of an intangible asset like intellec-
tual property. Thus, statistical accuracy suffers." Schachter also notes that the expected
magnitude of loss is also very difficult to assess: "[E]ven if the risks can be identified, it's
also difficult to estimate the magnitude of losses that can occur. As a result, only a few
types of policies insure against liability for intellectual property claims, and those that do
are sometimes of little benefit." David N. Schachter, Intellectual Property Insurance in
Short Supply, Denver Bus. J., Nov. 26, 1999, at 39A, available at 1999 WL 24308375.
2001] 2011
SMU LAW REVIEW
particularly, under Coverage "B" of that policy which insures against per-
sonal and advertising injuries. 6 As technology and the law evolve, policy-
holders, their counsel, and their carriers will face new and complex issues
concerning whether or not new risks and/or theories of liability trigger
the duty to defend, the effect of inserting exclusions in prior policies to
"clarify" the policy's coverage, whether or not new IP policies have been
triggered, as well as other similar issues.
Section V analyzes select insurance cases and key concepts in deter-
mining whether or not a claim that has resulted in litigation may be cov-
ered by the policyholder's insurance portfolio. This section analyzes
strategies available to a policyholder facing an intellectual property loss
or claim, the duties and obligations of an insurance carrier to investigate
and defend that claim after receiving notice of the claim, and the policy-
holder's ability to recoup its own investigation costs. Moreover, this sec-
tion also includes an analysis of the policyholder's options when facing a
denial of coverage or a reservation of rights letter, including entering into
a standstill agreement with the insurance carrier or filing a declaratory
judgment action against the carrier. Included in that discussion is a sy-
nopsis of Texas's duty-to-defend jurisprudence and the eight-corners rule,
as well as standing issues and potential issues concerning the cooperation
clause in the event the policyholder elects to file a declaratory judgment
action.
I. GENERAL BUSINESS RISKS ARISING OUT OF
OPERATIONS THAT ARE BASED PRIMARILY
UPON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Businesses that are primarily involved in the creation, dissemination,
distribution, production, and protection of intellectual property face
unique business risks and potential liabilities. 7 This section analyzes po-
tential risks posed by business competitors arising out of potential liabil-
ity for patent, copyright, service mark, trademark, unfair competition,
Lanham Act, trade dress, and anti-trust claims.8
6. For an excellent synopsis of the history and evolution of the CGL policy, see Ken-
neth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85
(2001).
7. See, e.g., Westport Ins. Corp. v. MP3.com, No. 01-CV-1899, S.D.N.Y. (complaint
filed to avoid providing reimbursement to MP3.com for legal settlements made by
MP3.com after U.S. Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York found that
MP3.com willfully infringed the copyrights of Universal Music Group and would be re-
quired to pay $25,000.00 for each CD copied to its database-which later resulted in a
settlement of $53.4 million). See also 6 MEALEY'S EMERGING INSURANCE DISPUTES 6
(Mar. 20, 2001).
8. This article focuses on conflicts that have arisen or that may potentially arise be-
tween domestic competitors. However, as U.S. firms expand overseas, conflicts between
U.S. companies and international companies will become more prevalent. Furthermore, as
developing countries seek access to new technology, disputes may arise concerning the
price to be paid for such access and the purpose for which the technologies may be used.
See Eveyln Su, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 Hous. J. lr,'L L.
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ARE YOU COVERED?
Companies are increasingly using their intellectual property rights,
technology, and the Internet to reach new markets, gain a competitive
advantage in existing markets, safeguard their existing market position,
and maximize their revenues and net income. Uncertainties concerning
the scope of patents have led to significant litigation, as well as disrup-
tions in leading industries such as the semi-conductor and the pharmaceu-
tical industries. Companies may use their intellectual property to attempt
to distinguish their goods and services from those of the competition and
to gain market share from the competition. Companies may also attempt
to extend existing patents to new uses. Other companies may use their
intellectual property rights as a revenue source by aggressively prosecut-
ing infringers. 9 Policyholders conducting business operations in the finan-
169, 170-71 (2000) ("The competitiveness of firms in developed countries is largely deter-
mined by the ability to develop, commercialize, and, most importantly, to capture the eco-
nomic benefits from technological innovations. In recent years, these industries have
experienced an increase in the number of infringement cases regarding protected corpo-
rate technology. These industries have pushed for the strengthening of global protection
on intellectual property rights because violations of protected intellectual property rights
cost manufacturers and companies billions of dollars in lost revenue each year. For in-
stance, the value of pirated goods in China was $2.3 billion in 1996 and $2.8 billion in 1997.
Governments have not only strengthened their own national laws protecting intellectual
property rights, but they have also entered into international agreements in an attempt to
create an international system of protection for intellectual property rights. In 1994, as part
of the Uruguay Round of negotiations and agreements, the Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights ('TRIPs Agreement') was adopted in Marrakesh, Morocco. This
comprehensive law governing the global protection of intellectual property rights provides
the protection that industries and developed countries have been seeking. However, the
TRIPs Agreement simultaneously narrows the developing countries' access to technology,
discouraging the rapid diffusion of new technology needed for economic growth.").
9. In a recent article by Carolyn Whelan in Fortune magazine, the author noted that
"[iun fact, a number of older, established tech firms have strategically opted to patent eve-
rything in sight, using a massive cache of protected material as both a revenue stream and a
truncheon against the competition. For example, Texas Instruments ("TI") has guarded its
stockpile of 10,000 patents as if it were Fort Knox. If a smaller company goes to market
with an integrated circuit that's even remotely close to that of TI's, the veteran
chipmaker-with its behemoth legal budget-can scare off this smaller company by threat-
ening an expensive lawsuit. Consequently, this leads smaller companies to settle out of
court, or strike some kind of licensing or royalty deal, simply to stay in business. Moreo-
ver, TI generates a whopping 20% of its profits through royalties. Likewise, mighty Intel,
in its latest courtroom battle, unleashed its legal arsenal on competitor Broadcom, which
the chip giant says infringed on five of its patents (and a few trade secrets to boot). Intel
has a war chest of 3,000-plus patents, while Broadcom ... has a mere eight. That's right,
eight." Carolyn Whelan, Are Patents Really A Virtue? Big Tech Firms May Flaunt Them.
But the Truth is, Often the Best Science is Kept Under Wraps, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 24218467. Ms. Whelan also points out that to take a different ap-
proach some companies have elected not to file patent applications because of the uncer-
tainties that may arise concerning the scope of the patent and because valuable
information is required to be disclosed in the public domain as part of the patent process,
thus providing the competition with a road map of the company's best technology. Id.
20132001]
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cial services,10 professional services," pharmaceutical sales,12 Internet, 13
software,' 4 hardware, and the retail sectors of the economy should be
especially wary of the prospect that their business activities might infringe
upon the intellectual property rights of their competitors. 15
10. Potential liability for financial services firms may arise out of unauthorized access
to client accounts, theft of account information, attacks on computer systems, unauthorized
transactions, "identity theft," i.e., stealing someone's identity and using that identity to
create credit lines and false account information, and other illegal and improper conduct.
11. Several prominent companies have attempted to market professional services over
the Internet. For example, drkoop.com provides medical advice. Likewise, many law firms
and accounting firms advertise over the Internet and may also provide legal or business
advice over the Internet or via e-mail. But providing professional advice over the Internet
to strangers via e-mail inquiries raises a host of liability issues.
12. Given the high number of prescription drugs that are expected to come off patent
in the next five years and the need to maintain revenues, a tremendous number of patent
lawsuits are expected to be filed by drug makers seeking to maximize their royalty reve-
nues. According to William Nixon, President of the Generic Pharmaceutical Association,
"whenever a brand-name drug is supposed to come off patent, there is a lawsuit. Then
there is the mysterious appearance of all these new patents." Theresa Agovino, Prilosec is
Just the Start: Drug Companies Fight to Hang On To Lucrative Patents, THE NEWS & OB-
SERVER, Raleigh, North Carolina, May 15, 2001, at D3, available at 2001 WL 3465081.
According to a UBS Warburg report, more than $30 billion in brand sales-about a third
of prescription medicines in the United States-are slated to come off patent between 2000
and 2005. Their report concludes that new drugs under development are not sufficient to
replace lost sales due to patent expiration. Id.
13. After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that business meth-
ods could be patented, the P.T.O. was deluged with patent applications. In perhaps the
most widely known case, Amazon.com sued Barnesandnoble.com, alleging that
Barnesandnoble.com infringed on its "one-click ordering patent." Anne Eisenberg, Copy-
right, Legal Issues in Stars for Celestial Jukebox, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, December 27, 1999, at
6, available at 1999 WL 31274616. The court's ruling surprised many patent law practition-
ers because it was thought that business methods were not subject to patents: "For 100
years, courts had held that business methods themselves could not be patented, said Barry
Rein, a partner at Pennie & Edmonds, but the 1998 ruling ran counter to that idea. Many
Internet companies promptly started filing patents for their methods, and some of them
then sued other companies for infringement." Id.
14. For example, Jupiter Media Metrix, Inc. recently sued competitors claiming that
they infringed software used to track visitors to websites. Ellen McCarthy, Media Metrix
Targets Rivals in Patent-Infringement Suits, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2001, at E05, available at
2001 WL 17616522. According to the Washington Post, "The company announced yester-
day that it has settled a patent-infringement case against PC Data Inc. of Reston-a deal
that will essentially force the smaller player out of business. Media Metrix then promptly
filed similar lawsuits in federal court against two other rivals, NetRatings Inc. of Silicon
Valley and NetValue SA of Paris." Id.
15. See also Claire Horn, Patently Unfair, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, Raleigh, North
Carolina, Feb. 19, 2001, at D1, available at 2001 WL 3453057 ("Considering the thousands
of patents that IBM can assert across diverse technologies-the company was issued more
than 2,800 last year alone-'the scale is always in our favor,' Rosenthal says. Patent port-
folios and cross-licensing practices are the new monopolies in the new economy, and a
source of growing concern to many creators of software and e-commerce systems. If you
can't pay cross-licensing fees, you won't get to play. If you land, even inadvertently, on
another's intellectual property, go straight to your lawyer's office and prepare to be
sued."). Some commentators believe that the "use of patent litigation for pure profit and
competitive advantage is fundamentally wrong." Michael Paul Chu, Note, An Antitrust
Solution to the New Wave of Predatory Patent Infringement Litigation, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1341, 1342 (1992) ("Although legitimate patent owners have exclusive rights to make,
use, or sell their patents, the question arises whether the corporate use of patent litigation
for pure profit and competitive advantage is fundamentally wrong.").
ARE YOU COVERED?
Intellectual property rights, including patents on business methods, and
the creation of recognized web sites may enable a policyholder to distin-
guish their goods and services from their competition in a unique or
meaningful manner and may force their competitors out of business.
Given the uncertainty created by mass patent filings and the increased
emphasis on the use of intellectual property to create meaningful barriers
to competition, policyholders operating a high technology enterprise or
conducting business operations on the net or in cyber-space should evalu-
ate their potential exposure to the following risks and develop an appro-
priate insurance portfolio16 to protect their businesses from potentially
crippling losses or litigation for the following risks:
1. That a competitor will claim that the policyholder has infringed its
patents, trademarks, service marks, trade dress, or copyrights; 17
2. That a competitor will claim that the policyholder has engaged in
unfair competition or has violated anti-trust statutes; 18
3. That a competitor will claim that the policyholder has misappro-
priated trade secrets; 19
4. That a competitor or former employer will claim that the policy-
holder has committed defamation, slander, or libel;20
5. That a competitor will claim that the policyholder has engaged in
tortious interference of business contracts; 21 and
16. Because specialized insurance policies providing insurance for patent infringement
and other claims have only recently become available, there are very few cases to guide
policyholders on the coverage afforded by such policies. In addition, because ISO's 1998
modifications and clarifications to the "standard" CGL policy have only recently been ap-
proved by state regulatory agencies, policyholders face some uncertainty regarding the
meaning of the changes to the "advertising injury" section of the CGL policy, under which
most of the cases cited in this article have been decided. Given the changes made to this
section of the policy, it is foreseeable that many coverage issues may arise. For example,
A-Frame Pools, Inc., a pool manufacturer, recently filed a lawsuit against a competitor,
Concord Pools Ltd., complaining that the competitor's website, www.aframepools.com,
which automatically diverted Internet browsers to the competitor's website, infringed the
plaintiff's trademarked name. As further explained in Section V below, evaluating
whether or not the duty to defend or the duty to indemnify are triggered raises several
questions: (1) does a domain name constitute an "advertisement"?; (2) does the registra-
tion of a domain name constitute "advertising activity"?; (3) are damages measured by the
plaintiff's lost sales as a result of the alleged trademark infringement or by the plaintiff's
lost sales and the competitor's gain in sales, or some other metric? The CGL Policy is
available at ISO website at http://www.iso.com.
17. See, e.g., Franklin v. Fugro McClelland, Inc., 16 F. Supp.2d 732, 735
(S.D.Tex.1997).
18. See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Travis, 2001 WL 569300 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001,
no pet. h.) (competitor accused of tortious interference of contract because of the alleged
misuse of proprietary client information).
19. See, e.g., 3V, Inc. v. JTS Enter., Inc., 40 S.W.3d 533 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
20. See, e.g., Bio-Medical Applications of Texas v. Dionicio Manuel Alvarez, M.D.,
2000 WL 1368048 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000) (suit against former employee involving the
breach of covenants not to solicit employees, compete, disclose trade secrets, unfair com-
petition claims, Lanham Act violations, tortious interference of contract claims, business
disparagement claims, and requests for permanent injunctions).
21. Gaia Tech. Inc. v. Recycled Prod. Corp., 175 F.3d 365, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1999)
("Gaia filed the present lawsuit on October 20, 1993, alleging that the defendants' use of
the Turner-Entek intellectual property amounted to federal patent and trademark infringe-
ment and various Texas law torts. The individual defendants in this appeal were affiliated
2001] 2015
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6. That the policyholder will become involved in litigation concern-
ing claims that a new employee has violated a covenant not to
compete. 22
Businesses that are particularly dependent on their patent portfolio
face enormous risks if their patents are challenged and ultimately invali-
dated or found to have a narrower scope than previously anticipated. 23
Likewise, businesses that are not based on technology or the Internet also
face significant potential liabilities arising out of their use of technology,
email, or the Internet. For example, a number of lawsuits have been filed
by discharged workers alleging that their employer violated their right to
privacy by reading their mail. 24
with Retex at the time of the alleged conduct. Turner was initially a defendant in this case,
but he settled with Gaia before trial. As for the other corporate defendants, Retek was
Retex's parent company, and Progressive was involved with Retek's efforts to raise money
for its operations. Id. at 368, n.1. The jury verdict found the corporate defendants liable for
all of Gaia's federal infringement claims, awarding damages totaling $3,972,500. It also
found the corporate defendants liable for three state law claims, awarding damages of
$125,000 for unfair competition, none for misappropriation of trade secrets, and $4,350,000
for tortious interference with prospective contractual relations.").
22. NCH Corp. v. Share Corp., 757 F.2d 1540 (5th Cir. 1985).
23. See, e.g., Nicholas Varchaver, A Hot Stock's Dirty Secret: Remember When Chip
Company Rambus Was the Talk of CNBC? Now It's Been Laid Low - By H's Own Duplic-
ity and Greed, FORTUNE, July 9, 2001, at 106, available at 2001 WL 2173007. Rambus ob-
tained licensing agreements from Hitachi and Samsung to license SDRAM technology.
Other companies, however, refused to pay Rambus licensing fees. Thus, Rambus ulti-
mately lost. Id.
24. See, e.g., Donald W. Schroeder, The Information Superhighway: Avoiding Work-
place Nightmares, 45 B. Bus. J. 8, 23 (Mar.-Apr. 2001) ("The widespread use of electronic
communications in the workplace has led to an increase in discrimination and harassment
lawsuits."). Schroeder writes that "[a] federal court in Pennsylvania dismissed a lawsuit in
which an employee claimed he was discharged because his employer wrongfully inter-
cepted his e-mail messages. Michael Smyth, Regional Operations Manager for the Pil-
sbury Company, received an e-mail at home from his supervisor. Smyth failed to show the
best of judgment in his responses, which contain references to sales management and
threats to 'kill the back-stabbing bastards.' Smyth also referred to a planned company
party as the 'Jim Jones Kool-Aid affair.' After intercepting the messages, Pilsbury decided
to terminate Smyth for transmitting what it deemed to be inappropriate and unprofessional
messages over the company's e-mail system. Smyth then sued for invasion of privacy. The
court decided that Smith did not have a claim against Pilsbury, holding that there could be
no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily made over the
company e-mail system. Additionally, the court would not consider Pilsbury's interception
of Smith's e-mail communications to be a substantially and highly offensive invasion of his
privacy. Moreover, the court reasoned that Pilsbury's interest in preventing inappropriate
and unprofessional activity over its e-mail system would outweigh Smyth's privacy interest.
At the same time, a Massachusetts state court refused to dismiss an invasion of privacy
claim where the president of the company allegedly reviewed his employees' e-mail
messages. In Restucciav Burk Technology, Inc., 1996 WL 1329386 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1996),
the corporation did not have an electronic communication policy against using the e-mail
system for personal messages. Moreover, the corporation never informed its employees
that their e-mail messages were saved onto backup computer files and that supervisors had
access to these communications. Following his review of certain e-mail messages between
two employees, Laurie Restuccia and Neil LoRe, the president purportedly terminated
them based upon their excessive use of the e-mail system. Under Massachusetts law, 'a
person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his
privacy.' MASS. GEN. L. Ch. 214 § 16. Finding a genuine material issue as to whether plain-
tiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail messages, the court declined to
grant summary judgment for the company. At trial, however, the jury granted a defense
2016 [Vol. 54
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II. GENERAL RISKS OF LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF
INVASION OF PRIVACY, SLANDER, LIBEL,
AND DEFAMATION CLAIMS
Policyholders also face a wide array of potential invasion of privacy,
slander, libel, and defamation claims from businesses and individuals. In-
dividual consumers may also seek to recover damages caused by the im-
proper practices of third parties, e.g., recovery for damages caused by
third parties "stealing" the identity of the consumer and making unautho-
rized purchases using the stolen identity.2 5 In addition, policyholders
may face suits arising out of consumer complaints regarding lack of access
to computer networks or network downtime. Consequently, there is no
verdict, finding insufficient evidence to support the plaintiffs' privacy claim." Schroeder, at
9 & 23. According to Schroeder, in another case in Massachusetts, "two African-American
employees sued Morgan Stanley for allegedly denying them promotions following com-
plaints relating to a racist e-mail distributed throughout the company's e-mail system."
Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 1997 WL 403454 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Plaintiffs alleged that
distribution of the racist e-mail constituted a hostile work environment. Dismissing plain-
tiffs' harassment claim, the court reasoned that a single offensive e-mail could not form the
basis for a claim of hostile work environment .... To avoid litigation, an employer should
establish a detailed electronic communications policy to minimize an employee's reasona-
ble expectation of privacy. The following principles should form the basis of the em-
ployer's policy: electronic communications, including e-mail, voice-mail, and the contents
of the employee's computer should be strictly identified as the property of the employer.
Use of this property by the employee must be strictly limited to the employer's business.
The employer must clearly reserve the right to monitor and access these communications,
including the contents of any business computer for any legitimate business reason. The
employer should specify the purpose of the employer monitoring and identify the extent of
any monitoring of employees' communications, including e-mail, voice-mail, computer files
and Internet use. The employee should also offer voluntary consent to electronic and tele-
phonic monitoring. Employees should also be aware that the use of passwords or codes
may be overridden by the employer for legitimate business reasons and that all passwords
and codes should be disclosed to the employer to facilitate this access. The employer
should reserve the right to inspect e-mail files at any time to ensure the system is not
abused by employees." Schroeder, at 23-24. We have not found a similar Texas case involv-
ing allegations by employees of employer misuse of internal communications systems. In
general, under Texas law, a claim for "intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion, solitude and
into his private affairs "requires that there be an intentional intrusion, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another, or his private affairs or concerns that is highly offensive to a reasona-
ble person. Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B (1977). This type of invasion of pri-
vacy is generally associated with either a physical invasion of a person's property or by
eavesdropping on another's conversation with the aid of wiretaps, microphones or spying.
Gonzales v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1977, no writ). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B, cmts. b, c, and d
(1977). The plaintiffs in this case allege this form of invasion of privacy stemming from the
publication of the list of employees who were sent "letters of concern."
25. The use of the Internet to commit fraud is becoming more prevalent. See John C.
Anderson and Michael L. Closen, Document Authentication in Electronic Commerce: The
Misleading Notary Public Analog for the Digital Signature Certification Authority, 17 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 833, n.29 (Spring 1999 Symposium) ("Reports of
Internet fraud tripled between 1996 and 1997. David Hayes, Internet Fraud: Oh, What A
Tangled Web! The Number of Complaints About Computer Crooks Is Rising Sharply,
YORK DAILY REC., Mar. 2,1998, at D6, available at 1998 WL 6211361. Last year, compa-
nies spent roughly $6.3 billion on computer network security systems, a figure that is ex-
pected to double by 2000. See L.A. Lorek, Security the Focus for Businesses as Internet




way to list or foresee the multitude of risks that a policyholder may face
in conducting its business operations. Some of the more significant risks
and potential liabilities that may occur include the following:
1. The policyholder's software will corrupt the consumer's data;26
2. The policyholder's hardware will fail;27
3. The policyholder's software may not perform as expected or as
warranted;28
4. The policyholder's network may not be accessible by consumers;29
5. The policyholder's hardware or software will contain glitches or
need to be recalled;30
6. The policyholder may not be able to deliver goods as promised to
the consumers by set schedules;
7. The policyholder's data relating to consumers will be hacked, and
then inadvertently released, disclosed, lost, or corrupted; 3'
8. The policyholder's hardware will become infected by computer vi-
ruses or that software developed to prevent viruses will fail;32 and
26. Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp.2d 942 (E.D.Tex. 2000) (multi-
billion dollar consumer class action settlement involving claims of data loss and data
corruption).
27. Comptech Int'l, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., 753 So.2d 1219, 1226 (Fla.
1999) (damage to tenant's computers constituted damage to "other property" within the
meaning of the applicable insurance policy) ("With this understanding of the use of the
term 'other property,' we agree that the trial and district courts erred in finding the com-
puters which were damaged during the warehouse renovations were not "'other
property.'").
28. For example, Intel has faced numerous suits alleging defects in its math co-proces-
sors. See Shaw, supra note 26, at 990. "For example, Intel has been repeatedly sued in class
action suits alleging defective computer designs, including its famous 1994 debacle with its
Pentium computer chip, which had a flaw affecting certain mathematical calculations."
29. For example, spamming or an unexpected spike in the numbers of e-mails sent on
a computer network may cause an ISP system to crash, thus preventing consumers from
accessing that network. See Michael S. Yang, E-Commerce: Reshaping the Landscape of
Consumer Privacy, 33 MD. B.J. 12, 16 (July/August 2000) ("If enough messages are sent,
the computer networks carrying the messages may even crash, thus costing consumers us-
age time and damaging the reputation of service providers. Because service providers are
private entities, they have prevailed against First Amendment challenges to their denial of
access to senders of unsolicited bulk e-mails.").
30. See, e.g., Taylor Inv. Corp. v. Weil, 2001 WL 391559, *2 (D. Minn. 2001) ("Shortly
after CMAC installed StarBuilder at Taylor, Taylor began discovering serious defects in the
software that made it entirely unusable. The record reflects that numerous other Geac
customers, including other customers of CMAC, were having similar problems with
StarBuilder. On March 5, 1996, Geac issued a memorandum to its sales force describing
various flaws in the software that customers had discovered.").
31. For example, banks providing online access to client information may be at risk if
that confidential information is inadvertently released or hacked. See Edward L. Ray-
mond, Jr., Annotation, Bank's Liability, Under State Law, For Disclosing Financial Infor-
mation Concerning Depositor or Customer, 81 A.L.R.4th 377 (1990); see also Peoples Bank
of Virgin Is. v. Figueroa, 559 F.2d 914, 917 (3d Cir. 1977) (unauthorized disclosure by bank
of customer's financial information would "breach[] duties of confidentiality and
privacy.").
32. See The Impact of Computer Viruses and other Forms of Computer Sabotage and
Exploitation on Computer Information Systems and Networks: Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee on Technology and the Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989).
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9. The policyholder's technology systems will fail to prevent attacks
on the consumers' computer systems.33
III. SIGNIFICANT RISKS OF POTENTIAL LIABILITIES
ARISING OUT OF NETWORK UNAVAILABILITY,
SYSTEM FAILURES, COMPUTER CRASHES,
COMPUTER VIRUSES, AND SIMILAR EVENTS
Policyholders face significant potential liabilities arising out of damage
claims related to system crashes, network downtime, and loss or corrup-
tion of data.34 In general, policyholders should safeguard their intellec-
tual and physical assets, to the extent economically feasible, against the
following types of business risks:
1. The policyholder's software or hardware will fail and the policy-
holder's systems will crash;
2. The policyholder's systems will be hacked;
3. The policyholder's data will be lost, corrupted, or stolen;
4. The policyholder's website will fail, causing significant loss of
revenues;
5. The policyholder's intellectual property will be misappropriated;
and
6. The policyholder's systems will be damaged by computer viruses.
IV. RISK OF LOSS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND TRADE SECRETS
Valuable intellectual property rights can be infringed upon, misappro-
priated, or stolen in many different ways. Successful products or designs
33. See, e.g., Eugene M. Katz & Theodore F. Claypoole, Willy Sutton is on the Internet:
Bank Security Strategy in a Shared Risk Environment, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 167 (2001)("Financial institutions are required to file a Suspicious Activity Report ("SAR") when
encountering a known or suspected violation of law or a suspicious transaction relating to a
money laundering activity in violation of the Bank Secrecy Act. The SAR procedures now
include 'computer intrusion' as a type of reportable 'suspicious activity.' 'Computer intru-
sion' is defined in the instructions to the SAR form as 'gaining access to a computer system
of a financial institution to: (a) [R]emove, steal, procure or otherwise affect funds of the
institution or the institution's customers; (b) [R]emove, steal, procure or otherwise affect
critical information of the institution including customer account information; or (c)[D]amage, disable or otherwise affect critical systems of the institution. For purposes of
this reporting requirement, computer intrusion does not mean attempted intrusions of
websites or other non-critical information systems of the institution that provide no access
to institution or customer financial or other critical information."'). Software and hard-
ware providers that are working with banks and brokerage firms to provide their custom-
ers with access to their accounts online obviously face tremendous potential liability in the
event safety systems are compromised.
34. For example, consumers may claim that the policyholder's products corrupted data
stored on the consumer's servers. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 26, at 942. According to the
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Petition, the defendants floppy-diskette control-
lers or ("FDCs"), "fail[ed] to detect the error, resulting in the storage of corrupt data or
the destruction of data without the user's knowledge." A class action settlement of $2.1
billion, along with attorney's fees of $147.5 million, was approved by the Hon. Thad
Heartfield in the Toshiba case. Sofia Adrogue, News and Departments Keeping Up with
Class Actions, 38 Hous. LAW. 52, 52-53 (2000).
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may be copied and sold in gray markets or overseas. Businesses may
attempt to reverse engineer protected products to save money or use the
well-recognized slogans of others in their marketing plans. Current or
former employees may improperly misappropriate valuable trade secrets
or other proprietary information.
In general, business policyholders face the following types of risks in
defending their intellectual property portfolio:
1. That competitors will infringe the policyholder's valid intellectual
property rights;
2. That competitors will copy the policyholder's products and dis-
tribute them in foreign, counterfeit, or gray markets;
3. That competitors will distribute the policyholder's products with-
out obtaining a distributorship agreement from the policyholder;
4. That competitors will pass off the policyholder's goods or prod-
ucts as the competitor's;
5. That competitors will incorporate aspects of the policyholder's de-
sign into products manufactured or distributed by the competitor;
6. That competitors will improperly divert business traffic on the In-
ternet to the competitor's website;
7. That competitors will claim that the policyholder should be re-
quired to enter into a licensing agreement because the policy-
holder has allegedly infringed on protected aspects of the
competitor's goods or services;
8. That competitors will hire the policyholder's employees or agents
and obtain information concerning the policyholder's trade
secrets and business operations; and
9. That competitors will engage in industrial espionage and steal
computer data, designs, product information, client lists, and
other proprietary information.
V. INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES ARISING OUT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION OR
THE THREAT OF LITIGATION
The risks of conducting business operations in the highly competitive
technology industry are significant and vary widely. Companies should
carefully evaluate their operations and consult with a risk assessment spe-
cialist to determine whether or not economically feasible hedges are
available to minimize or transfer the risks identified above to third par-
ties. Companies should attempt to minimize their risks by developing an
in-house risk management program that would potentially include the
following: (1) regular, periodic reviews of the company's insurance pro-
gram; (2) market intelligence evaluations to determine whether or not
competitors are likely to infringe on the company's proprietary technol-
ogy; and (3) legal reviews of the company's existing intellectual property
portfolio to determine whether additional patent, trademark, or service
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mark applications should be filed.35 This section covers policyholders'
potential responses to first-party and third-party claims that may be cov-
ered by insurance policies or indemnity agreements.
A. CRITICAL INITIAL DECISIONS CONFRONTING POLICYHOLDERS
FACED WITH AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIM
In the event a first-party or third-party claim occurs, the policyholder
should notify the insurance carrier or indemnitor as soon as possible.36
The policyholder should also request a copy of all insurance policies that
might provide coverage for the claim. Moreover, the policyholder should
be wary of memoranda prepared by employees relating to the claim of
expert reports or internal communications concerning the investigations
of the claim are within the scope of discovery, and not subject to work
product protection. The policyholder should also carefully consider the
process of tendering the claim to the insurance company and communi-
cating with insurance carriers. Policyholders should be aware that insur-
ance companies might claim that they relied on statements made by the
policyholder or the policyholder's employees in deciding whether or not
to defend the policyholder. If the policyholder's statements are later de-
termined to be inaccurate or incorrect, the insurance carrier might seek
to recoup its pre-tender investigation costs and defense costs. 37 In any
35. Given the expected growth of e-commerce and the continued increasing reliance
on technology, there is likely to be a substantial increase in the number of intellectual
property disputes in the near future. According to commentator Robert Paul Norman,
"[e]-commerce is growing at a simply phenomenal pace. Previously, it was estimated that
e-commerce would total $1.4 trillion by the year 2003. It is now virtually certain that e-
commerce will far surpass that estimate. Data 'traffic' on the 'Net' alone is growing expo-
nentially, somewhere between 200-600% per year. Tens of millions of people log on to the
Internet every day. Net traffic doubles every 100 days. Amazingly, PC's are becoming a
thing of the past in this new economy. In their place, hundreds of millions of hand held
Internet 'appliances' (such as cell phones and Palm Pilots) will be used to access the In-
ternet. This exponential growth of the Internet is resulting in additional exposure for users
of the 'Net.' Insurance carriers believe that e-commerce will be the 'single biggest insur-
ance risk of the 21st century.' REUTERS ENG. NEWS SERV. (May 9, 2000); J. COM. AB-
STRACTS 12 (2000). For instance, the so-called Love Bug e-mail virus caused an estimated
$15 billion in damages. Many insurance carriers have already gone on record as saying that
Love Bug losses are not covered under traditional insurance products. As a result, many
carriers have begun to produce new insurance policies, which are directed specifically at
the types of risks that exist in cyber space." Virtual Insurance: Is Your Old Policy From
InvisiblelNC.COM? If So, What Cyber Policy Adequately Covers Your Risks?, ABA's Tort
and Insurance Law Practice Group Seminar Presentation, March 20-24, 2001.
36. If there is a potential indemnification claim, the policyholder should review the
language of the indemnity closely. The indemnity provision may or may not address criti-
cal issues such as the responsibility for payment of investigation and defense costs, the
forum in which the claim will be resolved, the law that will apply to the resolution of the
claim, and other similar issues.
37. The legal counsel for the policyholder should also monitor interpretations of policy
language and adoptions of changes to policy language issued by the Department of Insur-
ance. Other commentators have noted that the Texas Supreme Court has shown an in-
creasing willingness to examine the opinions of administrative law bodies in determining
the scope of insurance coverage. See Hon. Rose Spector & Mary Keller, High Court and
Insurance Commission Perspectives on Bad Faith and Other Issues, TEXAS INSURANCE LAW
SYMPOSIA (1999) ("While the Court still adhered to its long tradition of interpreting poli-
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event, consultation with an experienced lawyer is essential to ensure that
the policyholder presents the insurance claim in the best possible manner.
B. THE INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND THE POLICYHOLDER
Because defending and prosecuting intellectual property claims in-
volves tremendous legal costs and uncertainties, policyholders and insur-
ers need to carefully assess their respective positions on the duty to
defend. Following the service of suit on a policyholder, these critical
questions should generally be addressed as soon as possible: (1) whether
the suit should be tendered to the insurance carrier; (2) whether the car-
rier should accept coverage and agree to defend the policyholder, deny
coverage and refuse to defend, or defend under a "reservation of rights";
(3) whether the policyholder should accept a limited form of defense of-
fered by the carrier in a reservation of rights letter or expend its own
funds defending the suit and seeking reimbursement later; (4) whether
the carrier should file a declaratory judgment action to determine its de-
fense and indemnity obligations; and (5) whether the policyholdercan re-
quire the carrier to prosecute a counterclaim. These are complex,
significant issues for both policyholders and carriers. Policyholders
should also take all appropriate steps to ensure that they recover their
"pre-tender" defense costs, including the costs of investigation. In order
to understand the strategies that are available to both policyholders that
are facing a lawsuit which alleges intellectual property liabilities and the
strategies that are available to the insurer in response, it is first necessary
to understand when the duty to defend is triggered under the "eight cor-
ners" 38 rule and the relatively few exceptions to that rule.39
cies under general rules of contracts, three of the opinions made reference to the regula-
tory oversight of the Department and one relied, to some degree, on an official order of
the Department and its finding with respect to the effects on rates. This recognition of the
Department began last term with the Court's opinions in Liberty Mut. v. Garrison and
Balandran v. Safeco. In Balandran, the Court detailed the Department's adoption of the
Texas Standard Homeowner's Policy-Form "B", including the intention of the Depart-
ment that any changes to the policy 'not in any manner restrict coverages currently availa-
ble to the insured.' This opinion was in sharp contrast to the 1995 decision in Nat'l Union
v. CBI Indus., in which the Court refused to consider the circumstances surrounding the
Department's adoption of the policy in question. In Garrison, the Court specifically recog-
nized the Department's 'unquestionable' expertise in the insurance trade and referred to
the Department's rules in interpreting the Insurance Code. The Court's opinions this term
and last signal a possible reconciliation of insurance law with other areas of administrative
law. Instead of viewing insurance policies as pure contracts, the Court may be adopting a
more modern view that insurance policies, often promulgated or approved by the Depart-
ment, are more in the nature of administrative rules where guidance from the administra-
tive agency would be useful and maybe even necessary."). Mr. Roach was counsel of
record in the CBI case.
38. The "eight corners" rule is also known as the "complaint allegation" rule.
39. See generally Lee H. Shidlofsky, The Duty to Defend: An Analysis of the Eight
Corners Rule, 9TH ANNUAL ULTIMATE INSURANCE LAW SEMINAR, STATE BAR OF TEXAS
(2000). Mr. Shidlofsky is an associate with Cook, Roach & Lawless in Austin, Texas.
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1. When Is the Duty to Defend "Triggered" Under Texas's "Eight
Corners" or "Complaint Allegation" Rule?40
The classic formulation of Texas's "eight corners rule" or "complaint
allegation rule" was provided by the Texas Supreme Court in Heyden
Newport Chemical Corp. v. Southern General Insurance Co.:
We think that in determining the duty of a liability insurance company
to defend a lawsuit the allegations of the complainant should be consid-
ered in the light of the policy provisions without reference to the truth or
falsity of such allegations and without reference to what the parties know
or believe the true facts to be, or without reference to a legal determina-
tion thereof.41
Courts will not look beyond the "eight corners" of the petition nor the
"four corners" of the insurance policy to determine whether or not the
insurer owes a duty to defend. 42
During their review of the petition, Texas courts initially focused on
whether or not the allegations made in the petition "were sufficient to
state a cause of action against [the policyholder] coming within the terms
of the policy."'43 The duty to defend was triggered when the factual alle-
gations stated a cause of action that could result in a judgment of liability
that would be covered by the insurance policy. However, Texas courts
now focus on the factual allegations made in the petition, rather than
focusing on a cause of action test. If the factual allegations state a claim
that may be covered by the insurance policy, then the court will find a
duty to defend. 44 Moving away from a cause of action test shifts the focus
away from the legal allegations made in the petition to the facts that
caused the alleged injuries, thus making it much less likely that an allega-
tion of negligence, for example, would trigger the duty to defend.
Under the eight corners rule, Texas courts also generally construe com-
plaint allegations liberally in favor of coverage. As stated in the Heyden
Newport case, "[w]hile we have said above that the court is limited to
40. This article focuses primarily on Texas cases and current Texas jurisprudence
concerning the duty to defend. For a summary of the jurisprudence of other states on the
duty to defend, see generally David A. Gauntlett, INSURANCE COVERAGE OF
INTELLEcTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS.
41. 387 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. 1965).
42. As explained by commentators Michael Sean Quinn and Pamela D. Nielson, "The
rule is quite simple. If a petition alleges facts which would, if proved, require the insurer to
make payments on behalf of the insured, then the insurer has a duty to defend. The truth
of the allegations [in the petition] does not matter in the slightest. Under the Eight Cor-
ners Rule, courts are not to 'read facts into the pleadings.' Furthermore, courts should not
look 'outside the pleadings, or imagine factual scenarios which might trigger coverage."'
Michael Sean Quinn & Pamela D. Nielson, Insurance Law, 51 SMU L. REV. 1131, 1167
(1998) (footnotes omitted).
43. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Moritz, 138 S.W.2d 1095, 1097-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1940, writ ref'd); see also Heyden Newport, supra note 42, at 26.
44. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139,
141 (Tex. 1997) ("It is not the cause of action alleged that determines coverage but the facts
giving rise to the alleged actionable conduct.") (citing Adamo v. State Farm Lloyds Co.,
853 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
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consideration of the allegations and the insurance policy in determining
an insurer's duty to defend, we wish to point out that in considering such
allegations[,] a liberal interpretation of their meaning should be in-
dulged. '45 Currently, there are few legal precedents concerning how
broadly allegations should be read in favor of coverage. However, in
Farmers Texas County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Griffin,46 the court held that
although factual allegations will be construed liberally in favor of cover-
age, the construction of the allegations must be reasonable. Moreover,
the court states that "Farmers is not required to defend Royal for another
reason: Griffin's petition does not allege that his injuries resulted from an
auto accident .... To read Griffin's petition as alleging an 'auto accident'
would strain that term beyond any reasonable meaning. '47
If, after applying a liberal pro-coverage interpretation to the allega-
tions, there is no doubt that the policy would not cover the factual allega-
tions pled, the court will not find a duty to defend. But courts disagree as
to when there is enough doubt to warrant a finding that the insurance
carrier has a duty to defend. For example, in Merchants, after liberally
interpreting the allegations in the plaintiff's petition, the Texas Supreme
Court overruled the Beaumont Court of Appeals' opinion that the allega-
tions made by the plaintiff triggered the duty to defend. The court held
that "[b]ecause the facts alleged in the pleadings do not suggest even a
remote causal relationship between the truck's operation and Gonzalez's
injury, they do not create that degree of doubt which compels resolution
of the issue for the insured. ' 48 Consequently, future decisions will likely
focus on whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff create a "degree of
doubt" that is sufficient to trigger the duty to defend.
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court has clarified that under the eight
corners rule, an insurer has no duty to conduct an investigation into the
merits of a claim when evaluating whether or not to defend the claim.49
Furthermore, there are obvious advantages and disadvantages of the
eight corners rule. The primary advantage is that the rule is simple to
apply. But the disadvantages include creating an incentive to file ground-
less pleadings that trigger coverage in order to force a settlement. First,
45. Heyden Newport, supra note 42, at 26; see also Merchants, supra note 45, at 141.
"When applying the eight corners rule, we give the allegations in the petition a liberal
interpretation").
46. 955 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1997).
47. Id. at 83.
48. Merchants, supra note 45, at 142. Under the court's analysis, the policyholder
would be required to show that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff resulted from the use
of the policyholder's truck. Although the policyholder was using the truck at the time of
the incident, the injuries were caused by the policyholder's allegedly negligent discharge of
a firearm. However, there was no link between the use of the truck and the discharge of
the firearm.
49. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 829 (Tex. 1997) ("[U]nder the
'complaint allegation rule' an insurer is entitled to rely solely on the factual allegations
contained in the petition in conjunction with the terms of the policy to determine whether
it has a duty to defend. The duty to defend is not affected by facts ascertained before suit,
developed in the process of litigation, or by the ultimate outcome of the suit.") (citing Am.
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Frito-Lay, 788 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ dism'd)).
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while the basic parameters of the rule are well known, there will always
be some uncertainty as to whether the factual allegations create a suffi-
cient degree of doubt to trigger the duty to defend. Second, the existence
of liability insurance coverage may provide an incentive to target compa-
nies that otherwise would not be sued. Finally, the eight corners rule pro-
vides an incentive to abuse the judicial process by requiring insurers to
defend cases as leverage for a settlement for an amount the insurer ex-
pects to be incurred in defense costs.50
2. Analysis of the Duty to Defend or Indemnity in Intellectual Property
Cases in Texas
There are few legal precedents in Texas to guide courts, policyholders,
and insurers concerning whether or not factual allegations made by the
plaintiff during intellectual property litigation can trigger the insured's
duty to defend under the eight corners rule. Each of the Texas cases in-
volves an "advertising injury"-type of claim under Coverage "B" of the
standard CGL policy.51 Based on these cases, it is critical that a policy-
holder show: (1) that the "advertising injury" arose out of and was "caus-
ally related" to the policyholder's "advertising activities"; and (2) that the
advertising offense first occurred during the time the policy was in
effect.52
Each case has been decided on one of the following five grounds: (a)
the underlying petition did not contain a factual allegation connecting the
plaintiff's alleged damages to the policyholder's "advertising activities";
(b) the conduct resulting in the alleged damages occurred prior to the
inception of the policy; (c) coverage was precluded for public policy rea-
sons under the "loss in progress" or "known loss" doctrine; (d) coverage
was precluded because the plaintiff sought equitable relief rather than
50. Some commentators have suggested that the complaint-allegation rule increases
the probability that a lawsuit will be filed against a company with insurance and that the
plaintiff's counsel must use the duty to defend to gain leverage in tort cases. For example,
Susan Randall has written that "the rules increase the likelihood that an insured will be
sued. Because the complaint measures an insurer's duty, plaintiff's counsel can manipulate
the pleadings to trigger the defense obligation, even in cases which are clearly not covered
under the policy. As a result, the existence of liability insurance drives tort litigation; a
defendant whose insurer can be involved in litigation is a more attractive target and more
likely to be sued than a defendant whose insurer cannot be involved. Second, although
individual insureds may benefit economically by receiving an insurer-provided defense, the
complaint rule works to the economic detriment of insureds as a class by raising insurance
costs. It raises costs in at least two ways: (1) by increasing the incidence of lawsuits; and (2)
by requiring a defense in cases not covered by the applicable policies. Moreover, defense
costs represent a significant expense for insurers, and these costs are passed onto insurance
consumers. Finally, the complaint rule increases the possibility of conflicts of interest in
insurance defense since an insurer must defend even where it believes there is no coverage
under the policy. Consequently, an insurer has a duty to defend until it can confine the
case to a non-covered claim. This formulation is a recipe for conflicts of interest. The
insurer's primary concern is demonstrating non-coverage; the insured's interest lies in
avoiding liability, or at least limiting it to a covered claim." Susan Randall, Redefining the
Insurer's Duty to Defend, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 221, 222-23 (1997).




damages; and (e) the activity alleged to have caused the plaintiff's dam-
ages was not "advertising" within the meaning of the CGL policy.
The courts' narrow approaches in resolving each case leave many of the
critical questions facing policyholders and insurers unanswered, including
the following: (1) when may an insurer recoup defense costs; (2) when
may a court properly consider extrinsic evidence in determining whether
the insurer owes a duty to defend; (3) when are the facts of the underly-
ing case sufficiently developed to permit the insurer to file a declaratory
judgment action; (4) when, if ever, is the duty to defend triggered by facts
alleged in a suit that are not contained in the plaintiff's petition; (5) what
res judicata or collateral estoppel effect, if any, does a declaratory judg-
ment in a subsequent coverage action have when the plaintiff amends its
pleadings to allege a claim that would trigger the duty to defend; (6)
should an insurer be required to defend when the insurer knows or is
aware of facts related to the underlying litigation that would require the
insurer to defend the action; and (7) when may a policyholder recover the
costs incurred in defending itself against a declaratory judgment action
brought by its insurer.
Because of the narrow focus in resolving these coverage cases, courts
likewise have not addressed broader cost and efficiency issues, such as:
(1) is there a feasible, better, and less costly alternative to litigation to
resolve duty to defend issues, such as arbitration or non-binding media-
tion; (2) is there an alternative to the eight corners rule that would allow
insurers and policyholders to better evaluate their respective positions to
avoid high cost and uncertainty.
a. The Linkage Between the Allegations in the Petition and the
Policyholder's Advertising Activities
In many jurisdictions, courts have held that there is no duty to defend
the policyholder in the absence of a "causal connection" between the pol-
icyholder's advertising activities and the alleged damages sustained by the
plaintiff.53 Insurance policies generally provide coverage for an "adver-
tising injury" which is "caused by an offense committed in the course of
advertising [your] goods, products, or services."' 54 Moreover, the defini-
tion of "advertising injury" contains a second nexus requirement as well.
In order for coverage to exist, the "injury" must arise out of one of these
four types of offenses: (1) oral or written publication of material that li-
bels or slanders another person or organization or that disparages an-
other person or organization's goods, products, or services; (2) oral or
written publication of material that violates another person's right of pri-
vacy; (3) misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business;
and (4) infringement of copyright, title, or slogan.
53. See, e.g., QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 773 A.2d 906 (Conn. 2001).
54. Id. at 921.
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In Bradleys' Electric,55 the court held that there was no duty to defend
the policyholder against a counterclaim alleging patent infringement and
contributory patent infringement. The court applied the eight corners
rule and found no duty to defend because the plaintiff's petition did not
contain any factual allegations that the policyholder's advertising activi-
ties caused the patent infringement to occur. 56
In Industrial Molding Corp. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 57 the
court examined whether a CGL policy provided coverage for trade dress
infringement claims brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.58
The plaintiff claimed that the policyholder introduced a "prototype
Christmas tree stand product for vertical positioning of a tree during Feb-
ruary 1996 at the Amer-Christmas Show in New Orleans. ' 59 The plaintiff
also claimed that the policyholder sold and marketed Christmas tree
stands, which infringed on the plaintiff's trade dress in a Swivel Straight
stand. The plaintiff's argument was that the policyholder was attempting
to avoid design, development, marketing, and advertising costs by copy-
ing the plaintiff's stand and had misappropriated the plaintiff's trade
dress in its product. The policyholder brought suit against its insurer and
sought a declaratory judgment that the insurer had a duty to defend, as
well as damages for breach of contract, DTPA violations, unfair insurance
practices, and bad faith. In ruling on cross motions for summary judg-
ment, the court held in favor of the policyholder that coverage existed
under the advertising injury section of the CGL policy for the plaintiff's
claims because there was "no doubt that the complaint accused IMC of
engaging in unlawful advertising activity... [and therefore] IMC has suc-
cessfully shown that the allegations in the underlying complaint aver an
55. Cigna Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Bradleys' Elec., 33 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 2000, pet. denied).
56. In addition to the court's holding, several other aspects of the case are significant.
First, despite the absence of any factual allegations linking the plaintiff's damages to the
policyholder's advertising activities, the policyholder's primary insurance carrier initially
agreed to provide a defense, subject to a reservation of rights. The carrier's decision re-
flects the uncertainty that exists in Texas regarding the application of the eight corners rule
and the penalties that follow from mistakenly denying the policyholder a defense. Second,
the primary insurer subsequently withdrew its defense and demanded to be reimbursed for
the costs incurred in providing the defense. The court was not required to address the
issue of whether or not the insurer was entitled to be reimbursed for the defense costs
incurred. Third, the court was not required to address issues regarding the res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect of the declaratory judgment. For example, if the plaintiff in the
underlying suit amended its petition, following the entry of the declaratory judgment, to
allege that the policyholder's advertising activities caused the plaintiff's damages, presuma-
bly under the eight corners rule, the insurer would be obligated to assume the policy-
holder's defense, notwithstanding the earlier entry of the declaratory judgment. Id. at 105.
57. 17 F. Supp.2d. 633 (N.D. Tex. 1998), vacated, Indus. Molding Corp. v. Am. Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co., 22 F. Supp.2d. 569 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (the parties settled their claims after the
district court entered its Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and de-
nying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Order vacating the Court's Sep-
tember 16, 1998 Order was made "pursuant to this settlement." The plaintiff "neither
oppose[d] nor agree[d] with" the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Order).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1996).




In reaching its holding, the court applied the three-part test applied in
Sentex Systems, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.61: (1) whether
or not the allegations in the underlying complaint raised a "potential" for
liability under one of the covered offenses stated in the policy; (2)
whether or not the insured engaged in an "advertising activity" during
the policy period when the alleged "advertising injury" occurred; and (3)
whether or not the insured's advertising activities were causally related to
the underlying lawsuit's trade dress infringement claims.
In addressing whether or not the first prong of the Sentex test had been
met, the court concluded that trade dress infringement was a covered of-
fense under the policy. The court cited a majority of cases holding that
the phrase "style of doing business," taken in its ordinary and popular
sense, embraced "trade dress."'62
Moreover, the court found that the second prong of Sentex was also
met because the insured's marketing activities constituted advertising
under the policy. Noting that the policy did not define "advertising," the
court applied the following broad definition of "advertisment" from
Black's Law Dictionary, which was based on a Texas case: "[n]otice given
in a manner designed to attract public attention. '63
Finally, the court held that the third prong of the test was met because
the insured's advertising activities were "causally related" to the trade
dress infringement allegations made in the underlying action. 64 "Not
only was misappropriation of trade dress alleged in the underlying com-
plaint, the required nexus between the advertising activities and damages
alleged by County Line also proved the necessary causal nexus. '65
Would the case have turned out differently under the ISO's revisions?
Probably not, especially given that the 1998 revisions specifically cover
the infringement of another's "trade dress."' 66
60. Id. at 639-640.
61. 882 F. Supp. 930, 936 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
62. Id. at 942-43. The court rejected Advance Watch Co. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 99 F.
3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996), which refused to find that "misappropriation of advertising ideas or
style of doing business" included trademark or trade dress infringement, under Michigan
law. Id. at 796.
63. BLACK'S LAW DICTnONARY 54 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Edwards v. Lubbock Co., 33
S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1930, no writ)).
64. 882 F. Supp. 930.
65. Indust. Molding, supra note 57, at 639.
66. However, the new definition of "advertisement" contained in the insurance policy
differs from the Black's Law definition. The new definition refers to "a notice" that is
"broadcast or published in the general or specific market segments about your goods, prod-
ucts, or services . . . ." whereas the Black's Law definition refers to "notice given" to the
public. Under the district court's view, the product itself arguably constitutes "notice
given" to the public whereas under the new definition it is possible that "a notice" separate




b. Coverage Precluded by the "Known Loss" or "Loss in Progress"
Doctrine
Several courts have held that coverage is precluded because the policy-
holder was aware of the loss prior to the occurrence at issue. In Franklin
v. Fugro-McClelland (Southwest), Inc.,67( six insurers brought suit against
two policyholders seeking a declaratory judgment that the insurers had
no duty to defend or indemnify in connection with a lawsuit pending
against the policyholders. However, the court's decision was based on its
application of the "known loss" and "loss in progress" doctrines.68
In the underlying litigation, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
infringed the plaintiffs' patents, misappropriated trade secrets, committed
fraud, breached fiduciary duties, tortiously interfered with existing and
prospective contractual relationships, and committed other similar
wrongful actions.69 The plaintiffs contended that an employee of Fugro's
viewed the operations and equipment of the plaintiffs under an obligation
of confidence. 70 Thereafter, Fugro allegedly solicited one of the plaintiffs
to perform soil sampling work for Fugro using a machine patented to one
of the plaintiffs and licensed to the other plaintiff.7 1 During the perform-
ance of the work, two Fugro employees were allowed to observe the work
but were advised that the equipment was patented and that the work
methods were confidential and were not to be used or disclosed to
others.72 Thereafter, one of the defendants allegedly solicited technical
information from the defendants regarding marketing, scheduling, and
billing.73 The information solicited was provided based on the belief that
Fugro intended to hire the plaintiffs to complete additional work.74
Plaintiffs allegedly learned later that Fugro had constructed a soil sam-
pling machine that would allow Fugro to perform the work itself.75 Fugro
was informed that the construction and use of the machine violated an
existing patent and the plaintiffs demanded that Fugro cease the infring-
ing activities and cease misappropriating plaintiffs' trade secret informa-
tion.76 Consequently, Fugro allegedly informed the plaintiffs that it
would no longer use the machine. 77 However, the plaintiffs claimed that
Fugro continued to use the machine and constructed additional infringing
machines.78
The court found that the claims were not covered by the advertising
injury section of the policyholder's CGL policy because "the alleged in-














jury began before the effective date of the insurance policy."'79 The court
relied heavily on Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co.,80 which held that trade
dress infringement claims were not covered because the wrongful activi-
ties began before the purchase of the insurance coverage. 81 Again, as in
the Bradleys' Electric case, because the court found that the patent in-
fringement occurred prior to the inception of the policy, the court was not
required to tackle the issue of whether or not patent infringement claims
would be covered by the insured's CGL policy.
The insurers advanced several other arguments against coverage.
However, because the court accepted the insurers' contention that the
"loss in progress" or "continuing loss" doctrine applied, the court did not
address the other non-coverage theories advanced. Prior to taking up the
"continuing loss" doctrine, the court first addressed the defendants' claim
that the declaratory judgment action was not ripe for adjudication be-
cause liability had not been determined in the underlying litigation. The
court rejected the defendants' argument in a footnote, finding that the
case "can be decided as a matter of law, without further factual develop-
ment in the underlying litigation. '82 Consequently, although the court
found that the ripeness standard had been met in this case, the question
of whether or not a declaratory judgment is ripe for adjudication will vary
with each technology case depending on the facts and circumstances of
the claims made in the underlying litigation.83
79. Id. at 734.
80. 901 S.W.2d 495, 502 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ.).
81. See id. It should be noted that the ISO's 1998 revisions include a new exclusion of
coverage for an advertising injury "caused by or at the direction of the insured with the
knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another or would inflict 'personal or
advertising injury."' This new exclusion appears to be intended to reinforce the doctrines
of "fortuity," "known loss," and "loss in progress."
82. Franklin, 16 F. Supp.2d at 735, n.3.
83. Several potential issues may arise in future cases in which the policyholder asserts
that the insurer's declaratory judgment action is premature. See generally Ellen S. Pryor,
Mapping the Changing Boundaries of the Duty to Defend in Texas, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV.
869, 889-890 (2000). For example, what if the policyholders in Franklin contested the
plaintiffs' claims in the underlying litigation and specifically asserted that they did not in-
fringe any of the intellectual property rights of the plaintiffs at any time? Is the duty to
defend defeated merely based on the plaintiffs' allegation of facts that the insureds' claims
are untrue? Isn't a declaratory judgment action inappropriate until the contested facts are
judicially resolved? What if the facts in dispute do not relate to the judgment being sought
in the underlying action? Is it appropriate for the insurance company to essentially inter-
vene in the resolution of the underlying case by filing a declaratory judgment action to
resolve the facts that are not essential to the judgment in the underlying litigation? How is
a court supposed to resolve such issues given the likely probability that the insurance pol-
icy is silent on the question of whether or not either party may file a declaratory judgment
to resolve defense issues in the underlying litigation? No Texas courts have addressed
these issues with respect to a technology claim, but such issues could produce a mass of
future litigation given the Two Pesos and Franklin decisions, which potentially present in-
surers with an incentive to file a declaratory judgment action to resolve the duty to defend
and duty to indemnify by claiming that the policyholder knew that a loss would occur prior
to purchasing the insurance policy. Broader questions of risk assessment and risk alloca-
tion also may arise. Did the policyholder bargain for a defense that would not be provided
until the insurer resolved factual questions that were not relevant to the adjudication of
underlying litigation? Who should pay for the costs of adjudicating the declaratory judg-
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In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co.,8 4 the court of appeals found that
there was no coverage because the alleged offense occurred prior to the
policy's inception date. The court recognized that trademark infringe-
ment is a "continuous wrong, and as such gives rise to a claim for relief as
long as the infringement persists. '85 However, the court appeared to
deny coverage for two reasons: (1) because the claim "constitute[d] a
known loss or loss in progress" that would be barred under the fortuity
doctrine; and (2) because "affording coverage to Two Pesos would violate
public policy by allowing protection for a known loss and permitting an
insured to benefit from its wrongdoing. '86
Finally, in Essex Ins. Co. v. Redtail Prod., Inc.,87 the court addressed
the question of whether or not an insurer should be required to defend or
indemnify the policyholder against federal trademark claims. The court
granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment on two grounds: (1)
the policy did not apply to offenses committed before the beginning of
the policy period; and (2) the fortuity doctrine precluded coverage be-
cause of the facts and circumstances of the case.88 In reaching its deci-
sion, the court focused primarily on a letter from the plaintiff in the
underlying action dated September 27, 1996, which "complained about
Redtail's marketing practices and alleged that Redtail's use of OMC's
marks violated its trademark rights." 89 Because this letter was dated
prior to the inception of the policy, the court ruled there was no
coverage. 90
c. Cases That Do Not Seek Damages
In Feed Store, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co.,91 the court addressed the issue
of whether or not the advertising injury section of the CGL policy re-
quired Reliance to reimburse the policyholder for its defense costs. The
Feed Store was sued by Dairy Queen, which claimed that The Feed Store
infringed upon Dairy Queen's registered service mark "Texas Country"
by using the phrase "Texas Country Cookin" in its business. 92 Judge
Mahon granted summary judgment in favor of The Feed Store that Dairy
ment brought by the insurer on the duty to defend? Is the insurer entitled to reimburse-
ment for defense costs, if any, incurred in investigating and defending the claims made
against the insured in the event the insurer prevails in its declaratory judgment action?
What if the plaintiffs in the underlying action amend their complaint to remove factual
allegations implicating the "known loss" doctrine? Are factual allegations in a superceded
complaint ever admissible in a declaratory judgment action brought by the insurer to es-
cape the duty to defend?
84. See supra note 81.
85. Id. at 500.
86. Id. at 502.
87. 1998 WL 812394 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1998).
88. See id.
89. Id. at *1.
90. See id. at *3.




Queen take nothing on its claims.93 The Feed Store then filed suit to
recover its defense costs incurred in obtaining the take nothing
judgment.94
Reliance Insurance sought summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that
Dairy Queen's suit "sought injunctive relief only, rather than damages,
and . . ." therefore the allegations in the complaint did not trigger a duty
to defend; and (2) that the phrase "Texas Country" is not a slogan and is
therefore an exclusion in the advertising injury section of the policy, thus
barring coverage. 95 The court affirmed summary judgment after review-
ing Dairy Queen's complaint and concluded that there was no allegation
where Dairy Queen was seeking to recover damages.96 But the court ex-
pressly declined to rule on the issue of whether or not "Texas Country"
constituted a slogan because of the "complexities of trademark law."'97
d. Cases Involving Intentional Acts
In ABC Distributing, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co.,98 the court
affirmed the district court's decision to grant the insurers' motion for
summary judgment. In the underlying action, ABC was sued by Lighting
Systems, Inc. in a seven-count complaint alleging trademark infringement
and other related causes of action. Because the "overall scheme" alleged
by Lighting Systems was "clearly intentional," the court determined that
the complaint fell within the intentional act exception to the policy and
that there was no duty to defend. 99
e. Cases Involving Trade Dress Issues
In Bay Electric Supply, Inc. v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co,100 Bay Electric
and FAE, Inc. filed a declaratory judgment and a breach of contract law-
suit against Travelers. The underlying action arose out of claims made
against Bay Electric and FAE by a competitor, American Circuit Breaker
Corporation ("ACB"). "ACB alleged that Bay and FAE [had] violated
federal and state law[s] prohibiting trademark and trade dress infringe-
ment, trademark dilution, and unfair competition.' ' 101 Moreover, "[t]he
allegations were based upon the sale by Bay and FAE of circuit breakers
bearing trademarks and configurations allegedly identified with and
owned by ACB."' 0 2 Travelers denied coverage on January 16, 1998.103
Thereafter on March 25, 1998, counsel for Bay Electric and FAE re-
quested reconsideration of travelers' decision, but again Travelers denied
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 74.
96. See id. at 73.
97. Id. at 75.
98. 646 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1981).
99. Id. at 209.
100. 61 F.Supp.2d 611 (S.D. Tex. 1999).





coverage. Subsequently, FAE and Bay Electric settled the underlying
lawsuit.104
In the coverage action, the court looked to Industrial Molding for gui-
dance on the issue of whether or not "claims of trademark and trade
dress infringement constitute an "advertising injury" under Texas law.' 10 5
The district court agreed with Industrial Molding that trademark and
trade dress infringement are covered "advertising injury" claims.' 0 6 In
reaching its holding, the court also relied on the three-part Sentex test
discussed in section (a) above.' 0 7
With respect to the first prong of Sentex, the court agreed with Bay
Electric and FAE's contention "that the physical appearance of a prod-
uct-the ornamental features which serve to identify its source and distin-
guish it from similar products-can reasonably be construed as either an
'advertising idea' or 'style of doing business.' "108 It may be significant in
future cases that a definition of "advertisement" has been added to the
CGL policy. Consequently, the court's emphasis may shift from the phys-
ical appearance of the product to the contents of the advertisement. Fur-
thermore, the ISO revisions delete coverage for misappropriation of the
"style of doing business."10 9 In addition, coverage for the "misappropria-
tion of advertising ideas" has been transformed into "the use of another's
advertising ideas in your 'advertisement.""°10 But if the product itself is
not an advertisement, cases such as Bay Electric may be resolved in a
different manner.
The district court also relied on the following history of the "advertis-
ing injury" coverage to reach its holding:
Until 1986, the standard ISO CGL form included "unfair competi-
tion" as a covered class of advertising injuries, and explicitly ex-
cluded injuries resulting from trademark, service mark, and trade
name infringement. In 1986, [the] ISO revised the standard form:
unfair competition was eliminated in favor of misappropriation of
advertising ideas and style of doing business, and the trademark, ser-
vice mark, and trade name exclusion was eliminated. Thus, a policy-
holder over time could reasonably infer that claims related to trade
dress would not be excluded from a CGL policy, based upon the 1986
revision of the standard form."'
The court also squarely rejected Travelers's contention "that only a
wholesale copying of all of a company's products falls within the scope of
104. Id.
105. Id. at 615.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see Sentex, supra note 62.
108. Id. at 615-16.
109. See id. at 617. The ISO revisions can be found at http://www.iso.com.
110. See id.
111. Bay Elec., supra note 101, at 617 (emphasis added). Moreover, a policyholder
should continue to have a reasonable expectation that claims related to trade dress will not
be excluded under the ISO's revisions because the revisions include coverage for infringe-
ment of another's "trade dress" in the policyholder's "advertisement."
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[the term 'style of doing business']. 1' 2 According to the court, "[s]uch
categories would be wholly artificial and impossible to apply in a consis-
tent fashion from case to case, and the Court declines Travelers' invita-
tion to do so.""13 The court states further that "[a]n examination of the
underlying [clomplaint in the instant action, in which it is unclear what
portion of ACB's products and ideas Bay [Electric] and FAE copied,
demonstrates the difficulty that a court would constantly encounter in
trying to ascertain from a complaint the precise extent of the alleged
infringement."' 14
f. Cases Concerning the Meaning of the Term "Advertising"
ANR Production Co. v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co.," 5
involved the issue of whether or not a policyholder's statement regarding
the ownership of a "debottlenecking" process installed in ANR's natural
gas plant constituted "advertising." The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the insurance company and the court of appeals
affirmed, holding that the policyholder's statements were not advertis-
ing." 6 "To accept ANR's definition of advertising would mean that any
time parties negotiated any kind of contract, there would be a potential
for coverage under advertising injury for representations or omissions
made during the negotiations."' 17
It will be interesting to see if coverage issues arise concerning whether
or not different types of oral representations regarding a policyholder's
goods, products or services made for the purpose of attracting customers
or supporters, count as "advertisements" under the new definition.
Would a statement by a policyholder to a prospective client that the poli-
cyholder owned a "debottlenecking" process made for the purpose of ob-
taining work, count as an "advertisement?" Would a similar statement
made in a trade publication constitute an "advertisement?"
Atlantic Lloyd's Ins. Co. of Texas v. Susman Godfrey, L.L.P.118 in-
volved the issue of whether a law firm's solicitation letter containing
statements about a doctor's "sloppy, callous, unacceptable, impersonal,
and indifferent" work and "outrageous" conduct fell within the definition
of "advertising injury."" 9 Although the case does not involve a cyber-
space claim, it highlights the importance of the new "advertisement" defi-
nition. Would a solicitation letter sent to one prospective client constitute
"a notice that is broadcast or published in the general public or specific
market segments about your goods, product or services for the purpose of
112. Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 618.
114. Id.
115. 981 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ).
116. See id.
117. Id. at 892.
118. 982 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no writ).
119. See id. at 475.
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attracting customers or supporters?" Does one person constitute a spe-
cific market segment?
3. Coverage Issues Raised in Intellectual Property Cases Outside of
Texas
a. Patent Infringement Claims
i. Cases Finding No Coverage for Patent Infringement
According to commentators, the majority of courts have ruled that pat-
ent infringement claims are not covered under the "advertising injury"
section of the policy.1 20 Moreover, several cases have found that there is
no duty to defend or indemnify the policyholder against patent infringe-
ment claims. For example, in an unpublished opinion, the Delaware Su-
perior Court ruled that "advertising injury" coverage does not extend to
coverage for patent infringement actions.12 1 The Court determined that
the policyholder's allegedly infringing actions did not "'[arise] out of' or
[occur] 'in the course of"' its advertising activities as required by the
policies.122
In a second unpublished opinion, Doskocil, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co.,1 23 the court ruled that the "advertising injury" provision of a Trav-
elers' policy was not triggered because the patent infringement action
made "no mention whatsoever of advertising activity" on the part of [the
policyholder]."' 1 4 Applying Texas law, the California court refused to
consider the policyholder's "ample extrinsic evidence" under the eight-
corners rule.1 25 When extrinsic evidence may be introduced under the
120. Bruce Telles, Insurance Coverage for Intellectual Property Torts in Cyberspace,
MEALEY'S EMERGING INS. Disp., July 3, 1997, at http://www.newslettersonline.com/
mealeys/search.htm ("Policyholders have frequently, and almost always unsuccessfully, at-
tempted to obtain coverage for suits alleging that they have infringed a third party's pat-
ents. Courts have generally rejected these efforts, with a majority of the courts holding
that patent infringement is not an enumerated offense.").
121. ABB Flakt, Inc. v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., No. 94-C-11024, 1998 WL 437137 (Del.
Super. Ct. June 10, 1998).
122. See id. at 9. In the underlying case, Joy Technologies, Inc., one of Flakt's competi-
tors developed a flue gas desulfurization (FGD) system covered by a patent. Joy sued
Flakt in 1989 for direct, inducing, and contributory patent infringement. A jury found in
Joy's favor on all three counts, finding that Flakt directly infringed, contributed to the
infringement, and induced infringement of the patent. Joy subsequently filed a second suit
alleging Flakt adopted certain contracts from Combustion Engineering, Inc. and commit-
ted acts identical for which Flakt was found liable in the first suit. Flakt sought a defense
and indemnity from its insurance carriers, which denied coverage, and subsequently Flakt
filed a declaratory judgment action. The court entered summary judgment for the insur-
ance carriers, finding that patent infringement did not fall within the enumerated offenses
in the policies and that there was no causal connection between the patent infringement
and the policyholder's advertising activities. The court also determined that "misappropri-
ation" refers to the common law tort and not to conduct prohibited by statute and thus did
not encompass patent infringement. This case was later affirmed by the Delaware Su-
preme Court, which agreed that the infringement for which the insured sought coverage
did not arise out of or occur in the course of the insured's advertising activities.
123. 1999 WL 430755 (N.D. Cal. 1999).




eight corners rule is a question that has not been fully resolved by the
Texas courts. 126
Similarly, in Clark Mfg. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 127 the court rejected cov-
erage claims for patent infringement and inducement to infringe a patent
and ruled that the claims made against the policyholder did not arise out
of the insured's advertising activities, but rather out of the insured's al-
leged misappropriation and use of its trade secrets to manufacture and
sell components patented by a competitor. Likewise, in Julian v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co.,128 the court found that the policyholder had no reasona-
ble expectation of patent infringement coverage because the policy lan-
guage restricted coverage to advertising injuries. 129 Additionally, the
court found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the alleged of-
fense arose from their advertising activities. 30
ii. Cases Finding Coverage for Patent Infringement Claims
Everett Associates, Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co.,' 3 ' held that the
phrase "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business"
is ambiguous and could reasonably be construed by the policyholder to
cover patent infringement claims.' 32 In addition, the court found there
was a sufficient nexus between the policyholder's advertisement and the
patent infringement claims asserted by Clark to establish a causal connec-
tion and to require the carrier to defend the action. 133 According to the
court,
Plaintiffs argue that the addition of the "offers to sell" language in
Section 271 [of the Patent Act], along with claims against Everett in
the Clark action based upon Everett's advertising of the allegedly
126. The court also determined that the continuing tort of patent infringement is not
covered if the tortious activity begins before the inception of the policy, essentially follow-
ing the reasoning of Two Pesos. See supra note 81. Moreover, the court held hat "there
was no offense during the policy period since [the policyholder] began making and selling
its allegedly infringing products before June 30, 1997." Doskocil, supra note 124, at 3.
127. 187 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion).
128. 682 A.2d 611 (Conn. App. 1996).
129. Id.
130. Id. Several courts have addressed the issue of whether or not advertising, selling
or marketing activities infringe patent rights. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Siliconix, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 264, 270 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Intex Plastic Sales Co. v. United
Nat'l Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 254, 256 (9th Cir. 1994) ("infringement does not occur in the course
of the insured's advertising activities"); Iolab Corp. v. Seeboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500,
1507 (1994) (it is necessary to show that advertising caused the patent infringement, rather
than the liability; moreover, it is also necessary to show that the loss was caused by adver-
tising, rather than by the infringement of a patent); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Chaides
Constr. Co., Inc. 847 F. Supp. 1452, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("The acts of making, selling, or
using [a patented invention] simply do not arise out of the insured's advertising activities.
Selling is not equivalent to advertising."); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Water Cloud Bed Co.,
Inc., Cal. Rptr. 2d 442, 446 (1993) (In patent infringement cases, [tihe patentee is not in-
jured because a product incorporating its invention is advertised; rather, he is injured be-
cause the infringer, without consent, used or sold a product utilizing a protected
invention").
131. 57 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Cal. 1999).




infringing products, create a sufficient causal connection between the
patent infringement and the advertising injury to invoke Defendant
Transcontinental's duty to defend. In addition, the "offers to sell"
language creates an objectively reasonable expectation on the part of
the insured that the insured could be prosecuted for advertising in-
jury in a claim for patent infringement. Transcontinental hotly dis-
putes these contentions. However, for two reasons, this Court must
agree with Plaintiffs. First, the cases cited by Transcontinental which
determine [that] there is no duty to defend patent infringement
claims indicate that the very reason those courts found no duty was
because the Patent Act did not, at that time, include the "offer to
sell" provision that it now contains. Second, the court in the under-
lying Clark action, based upon the new language in the Patent Act,
entertained the plaintiff's claims for patent infringement based on
Everett's advertising activity. This alone is enough to demonstrate
the required causal connection between Everett's advertising activi-
ties and the patent infringement claim. In addition, it indicates that
the insured could have an objectively reasonable expectation that it
could be prosecuted for advertising injury in a claim for patent
infringement. 134
The court also rejected Transcontinental's argument that coverage is
barred by the policy's "first publication" exclusion, noting that Transcon-
tinental did not conduct an investigation before denying coverage and
was not aware of the possible application of the exclusion at the time the
suit was tendered for defense. 135
In Foundation for Blood Research v. St. Paul Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 1 3 6
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that a general commercial in-
surer had a duty to defend a policyholder in an action alleging that the
policyholder induced patent infringement. The policy provided coverage
for advertising injury and personal injury that included coverage for inju-
ries resulting from belittling the products of others. 137 The court pro-
vided an example of an insured belittling the validity of a plaintiff's
patent to third parties and the third parties' attempt to infringe the plain-
tiff's patent as a potentially covered claim. In doing so, the court refused
to limit the meaning of "belittle" to the archaic tort of belittlement. 138
Likewise, the court in Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corp. v. Employ-
ers Ins. of Wausau,139 held that an insurer was obligated to defend its
policyholder in a suit alleging that the policyholder infringed a drug pat-
ent by selling a competing version of a drug patented by Pfizer. The
panel found that the insured's dissemination of the information about its
competing drug in trade journals and at presentations brought its conduct
within the advertising activity requirement and that a causal connection
134. Id. at 881-82 (emphasis in original).
135. See id. at 884-85.
136. 730 A.2d 175 (Me. 1999).
137. See id. at 179-80.
138. See id.
139. 144 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 1998).
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existed between such advertising activity and the harm allegedly suffered
by Pfizer.14 0 According to the court,
In 1992, when Pfizer filed its complaint, it was an open question of
federal patent law whether the subsequent dissemination of clinical
studies and information developed for the purpose of obtaining FDA
approval for a drug or medical device deprived a defendant of the
protections of section 271(e)(1) and therefore gave rise to an action
of section 271(a). Under such a theory of liability, the dissemination
of the data in a company's advertising would give rise to an action
for patent infringement, because the dissemination would retroac-
tively deprive the protected use of the patented drug to collect the
data of its exemption. Construed this way, Pfizer's lawsuit provided
the necessary causal connection between the alleged patent infringe-
ment and Elan's advertising activities, because ... until that activity
took place, the clinical studies at issue would have been exempt. 141
But in Union Ins. Co. v. Land & Sky, Inc.,142 the court found an ambi-
guity in the insurance policy at issue because the excess policy included
an express exclusion of patent infringement coverage, but the underlying
policy did not.143 According to the court,
However, we note that the court in Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. did not
have to consider the additional evidence of an ambiguity present in
this case-the express exclusion of patent infringement coverage in
the excess policy. The fact that Union determined it necessary to
exclude patent infringement in the excess policy would indicate a be-
lief on Union's part that patent infringement was included in the pri-
mary policy. We find that this inconsistency in the two policies
create an ambiguity regarding the meaning of the term 'piracy.'
Thus, we find that the term 'piracy' is ambiguous and is capable of at
least two definitions. Because the term is susceptible to two reasona-
ble interpretations, one encompassing patent infringement and the
other one not, we construe the term 'piracy' in favor of the
insured .... 144
iii. Views of Commentators Concerning Coverage for Patent
Infringement claims.
Commentators are divided on the issue of whether or not there is ad-
vertising injury coverage for patent infringement claims under the 1985
coverage form. David A. Gauntlett, a policyholder advocate, contends
that patent infringement may fall within advertising injury coverage. 145
Gauntlett's analysis is based on coverage for "piracy" that was eliminated
by ISO's 1985 revisions. Moreover, Gauntlett has since taken the posi-
tion that the phrase "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of do-
140. See id.
141. Id. at 1379-80 (footnotes omitted).
142. 529 N.W.2d 773 (Neb. 1995).
143. See id.
144. Id. at 777.
145. See David Gauntlett, The Case for "Advertising Injury" Coverage of Intellectual
Property Litigation, A.B.A. INTELL. PROP. L. SEC. (Aug. 2, 1998).
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ing business" contained in the post-1985 policy, but deleted by the 1998
revisions, is subject to a number of reasonable definitions, "some of
which encompass patent infringement claims."'1 46
George B. Hall, an insurance company advocate, strongly disagrees
that patent infringement claims of any nature are covered. 147 Hall agrees
with the reasoning set forth in Gencor Industries, Inc. v. Wausau Under-
writers Insurance Co., 148 which states that "[it is nonsense to suppose
that if the parties had intended the insurance policy in question to cover
patent infringement claims, the policy would explicitly cover infringe-
ments of 'copyright, title or slogan,' but then include patent infringement,
sub silentio, in a different provision, by reference to [an] 'unauthorized
taking of ... [the] style of doing business."1 49
b. Coverage Issues in Cases Raising Copyright, Trademark, And
Service Mark Claims
1. Cases Finding Coverage
Courts are divided on the question of whether or not advertising injury
coverage extends to cover claims of infringement of copyrights, trade-
marks, and service marks. In Advance Watch v. Kemper National Ins.
Co., 150 the court held that coverage for "misappropriation of advertising
ideas or style of doing business" extended only to the common law tort of
misappropriation and did not extend to rights subject to "statutory sys-
tems protecting intellectual property: copyright, patent, trademark/decep-
tion as to origin."' 151 However, the court in Lebas Fashion Imports v. ITT
Hartford Ins. Group,152 reached the opposite conclusion, finding the cov-
erage ambiguous and holding that trade dress and trademark infringe-
ment claims were potentially covered.' 53
In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court in Doron Precision Systems, Inc.
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,' 54 found a duty to defend on the
part of United States Fidelity & Guarantee (USF&G) in a copyright ac-
146. See David Gauntlett, Exposing Duplicity of Insurer Analysis of 'Advertising Injury'
Offenses, MEALEY'S EMERGING INS. Disp., at http://www.newslettersonline.com/mealeys/
search.htm.
147. See George Hall, A Logical Approach to Advertising Injury Coverage, MEALEY'S
EMERGING INS. Disp. (June 3, 1999), at http://www.newslettersonline.com/mealeys/search.
htm.
148. 857 F. Supp. 1560 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
149. Id. at 1564.
150. 99 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996).
151. Id. at 802 (quoting U.S. Gulf Assoc. v. Data-Max, Inc. 749 F.2d 1028, 1035 (3d Cir.
1984)).
152. 50 Cal. App. 4th 548 (1996).
153. See id.; see also Zurich Ins. Co. v. Keller Music, Inc., 998 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1993).
Furthermore, in Federal Ins. Co. v. Microsoft Corp., WL 371416 (W.D. Wash. April 14,
1993), order vacated by 1994 WL 510102, Microsoft obtained a defense of Apple's suit
against it for copyright infringement based on Microsoft's Windows platform on the basis
of allegations that Microsoft had infringed Apple's copyright by marketing, distributing,
and licensing Windows. See id.
154. 963 P.2d 363 (Idaho 1998).
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tion. The court rejected USF & G's argument that the advertising injury
provision did not cover copyright infringement unless the advertising it-
self constituted copyright infringement. 155 According to the court,
Doron's complaint alleged that Denison violated Doron's copyrights
regarding certain films and computer programs by copying such ma-
terial, by placing the material on the market, by selling or giving
away such material, and by showing and displaying such material.
Although the allegations do not directly state that the copyright in-
fringement occurred in the course of advertising, these allegations in
the complaint, when read broadly, reveal a potential for liability
under the insurance policy. Specifically, the allegations that Denison
showed and displayed the copyrighted materials, and placed the
materials "on the market," gave rise to the potential that Denison's
copyright infringement activities were related to or connected with
advertising. Where there is doubt as to whether the complaint suffi-
ciently alleged advertising injury, USF & G must defend regardless
of its potential defenses. 156
Finally, in Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading
USA Co.,157 the court held that gray market figurines with genuine U.S.
trademarks that had different color patterns but were virtually identical
in all other respects, were materially different for purposes of trademark
infringement analysis.' 58
2. Viewpoints of Commentators Concerning Trade Dress Trademark,
Copyright, or Service Mark Infringement Claims
Commentators and courts in other jurisdictions are divided on the issue
of whether or not advertising injury coverage exists for trademark, copy-
right, or service mark infringement claims under the 1985 advertising in-
jury coverage. Hall believes such claims are not covered, citing an
attachment to a January 6, 1998 ISO circular, which states:
Infringement[s] of trademark[s] w[ere] never intended to be covered
under Personal and Advertising Injury Liability Coverage, and delet-
ing the term 'title' [from the infringement of copyright, title, or slo-
gan offense] clarifies that original intent. The phrase 'infringement
of copyright' is intended to encompass publication titles such as title
of song, title of book, etc.' 59
One of the ISO's implicit goals in revising the coverage may have been
to eliminate coverage for trademark infringement. Laurence Monin has
155. See id. at 365.
156. Id. at 366.
157. 112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997).
158. Mr. Roach served as co-counsel to the policyholder in the Martin's Herend litiga-
tion. See also Arifs Haq, Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA
Company: Gray Market Goods; Reason Makes a Run for the Border, 23 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
CoM. REG. 381, 391 (1998); Societedes Produits Nestle S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d
633, 641 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that a material difference is presumed to exist where the
consumer would likely consider such a difference relevant to the decision of whether or not
to purchase the product).
159. Hall, supra note 148.
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concluded that "[a]lthough coverage for 'trademark infringement' may
now be more clearly not covered, undoubtedly insureds in many future
cases will seek to find a 'copyright, trade dress or slogan' hook." 160
With regard to copyright infringement, commentators note that while
the insured's advertising activities must still proximately cause the inju-
ries sustained by the copyright holder, the courts have accepted a "rela-
tively slim connection" at least for purposes of requiring a defense. 161
c. Cases Outside of Texas Regarding Unfair Competition Claims
In Western States Ins. Co., v. Wisconsin Wholesale Tire, Inc.,,162 the
court found that a complaint filed against an insured accused of unfair
competition through misappropriation of customer lists did not trigger
defense or indemnity obligations under the personal injury or advertising
injury sections of the policy.
Furthermore, the court concluded there was an insufficient nexus be-
tween the allegations of business disparagement and unfair competition
and the policyholder's "advertising activities." According to the court,
Wisconsin Tire ... relies on paragraph (c), asserting that MITA ac-
cused it of "piracy" and "unfair competition." This is a sensible char-
acterization of MITA's complaint-but of course the "advertising
injury" clause does not cover all piracy and unfair competition. It
insures only those incidents of piracy and unfair competition that
arise out of Wisconsin Tire's "advertising activities of [its] own
goods, products or services."'1 63
The court also distinguished between "advertising" and "marketing"
and reasoned that if advertising were found to be equivalent to marketing
"[t]hen the work of a salesman in calling up customers is 'advertising', an
unnatural use of that word, and any effort to sell that involves one of the
four listed 'offenses' is covered.' 64 The court found that such an inter-
pretation would not be sensible and declined to "torture ordinary words
until they confess to ambiguity." 65
The court also relied on Diversified Investments Corp. v. Regent Ins.
Co.,166 in which the court held that even though the plaintiff's damages in
the underlying action arose out of the insured's advertisement of bicycles
that copied its rivals protected design, there was no "advertising injury"
coverage because "there must be something wrongful about the advertis-
ing."'1 67 According to the Seventh Circuit, to hold otherwise would mean
that "a fairly narrow clause [would] cover almost every injury connected
160. See id.
161. See Martin C. Loesch & David M. Brenner, Coverage on the Technology Frontier,
presented at the ABA's Committee on Insurance Coverage seminar in Tucson (March 14-
15, 1997).
162. 184 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1999).
163. Id. at 702.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 596 N.W.2d 502 (Wis. App. 1999).
167. 184 F.3d at 703.
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with a business operation."'1 68 But Justice Rovner strongly disagreed in
her dissent. She concluded that the "advertising injury" provision ap-
plied, reasoning that the complaint explicitly alleged that Wisconsin Tire
damaged MITA's reputation through, among other methods, "print
advertising. "169
In Comsat Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 170 Senior Judge Alsop
ruled that "St. Paul owed Comsat a duty to defend for claims of commer-
cial disparagement under its express personal injury coverage for making
known ... material that belittles products."'1 71 The court found that fac-
tual claims within the pleadings required the carrier to defend, even
though no express cause of actions were plead for commercial disparage-
ment or trade libel.' 72
In A-Mark Financial Corp. v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Co., 17 3 the
court found there was not a duty to defend an insured against claims of
unfair competition made under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. The
cases cited above arose under the 1985 coverage that provided protection
for "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business."
But this coverage was eliminated by ISO's 1998 revisions and subse-
quently replaced with two types of coverage for: (1) misappropriation of
advertising ideas; and (2) coverage for trade dress infringement occurring
in the insured's advertisement. 74
3. The Impact of ISO's 1998 Revisions to "Advertising Injury"
Coverage on the Duty to Defend
Policyholders and insurance carriers also should consider the coverage
impact, if any, of significant changes to the "advertising injury" section of
the CGL Policy by ISO. Under the most recent CGL policy approved in
Texas, "advertising injury" is generally defined as an injury "caused by an
offense committed in the course of advertising your goods, products or
services, 75 but only if the offense was committed in the 'coverage terri-
tory' during the policy period."'176 "Advertising injury" is generally de-
fined under Section V of the typical CGL policy as
Injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses:
168. Id.
169. See id. at 704 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
170. D. Minn. Civil Action No. 97-2236 (Mar. 6, 1998).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
174. See Copart, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2001 WL 327747, at 1 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Trav-
elers argues that there was no duty to defend the Woltz action because Copart was not
sued for copyright infringement committed 'in the course of' its advertising. Although the
Woltz complaint did not specifically articulate an advertising claim, the copyright infringe-
ment that it did allege could encompass copies of the program interface which Copart left
with potential customers as a demonstration of its services").




(1) Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a
person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's
goods, products, or services;
(2) Oral or written publication of material that violates a person's
right of privacy;
(3) Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business;
or
(4) Infringement of copyright, title or slogan. 177
Section 2 of Coverage "B" generally provides that the insurance does
not apply to "advertising injury:"
(1) Arising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by
or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity;
(2) Arising out of an oral or written publication of material whose
first publication took place before the beginning of the policy
period;
(3) Arising out of the willful violation of a penal statute or ordi-
nance committed by or with the consent of the insured;
(4) For which the insured has assumed liability in a contract or
agreement. This exclusion does not apply to liability for dam-
ages that the insured would have in the absence of the contract
or agreement;
(5) Arising out of breach of contract, other than misappropriation of
advertising ideas under an implied contract;
(6) Arising out of the failure of goods, products or services to con-
form with advertised quality or performance;
(7) Arising out of the wrong description of the price of goods, prod-
ucts or services; and
(8) Arising out of an offense committed by an insured whose busi-
ness is advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting. 178
ISO proposed revisions to the advertising injury coverage in 1998, and
those revisions have been adopted by every state, except Texas and Loui-
siana.179 Moreover, ISO's "Notice to Policyholders" clarifies that the re-
visions are not intended to narrow the scope of coverage:
[T]he changes in the Personal and Advertising injury in these cover-
age forms result in broadening the coverage in certain respects and
may, in certain states, result in a decrease in [coverage in] other re-
spects. The impact of the changes in the revision [is] very difficult to
quantify and may differ in different states. Taken as a whole, the
revised Personal Injury and Advertising Injury Coverage [are] at
least equal to, if not broader than, that which the current coverage
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Lawrence 0. Monin provides an excellent discussion of the ISO's revisions in his
article entitled "ISO Advertising and Personal Injury 1998 Revisions: Major Surgery or Just
a Band-Aid Fix?," published in MEALEY'S EMERGING INS. DisP. (Aug. 19, 1999). Monin
concludes that while the revisions are "positive ones, and, in particular, help restore the
prior 'advertising injury' coverage . . . to its apparent original intent," "time will likely





A comprehensive discussion of all of the ISO's revisions is beyond the
scope of this article.181 However, two significant changes to the form
should be noted:
First, the ISO has included, for the first time, a definition of "advertise-
ment," which is defined as "a notice that is broadcast or published in the
general public or specific market segments about your goods, products, or
services for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters."'18 2 This
definition may eliminate confusion in the courts regarding whether or not
advertising is equivalent to marketing and whether or not statements by
sales persons constitute advertising. In other words, the intent of defining
the term "advertisement" appears to be to restrict coverage.
Second, coverage for "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business" has been eliminated and replaced with two coverages,
one for "[the] use of another's advertising ideas in your 'advertisement"',
and the other for infringing upon another's "trade dress" in "your 'adver-
tisement."' 183 "Trade dress" is not defined and may be construed
broadly. For example, in Two Pesos, the jury was instructed that '"[t]rade
dress' is the total image of the business. Taco Cabana's trade dress may
include the shape and general appearance of the exterior of the restau-
rant, the identifying sign, the interior kitchen floor plan, the decor, the
menu, the equipment used to serve food, the servers' uniforms and other
features reflecting on the total image of the restaurant."' 184 Monin notes
that the ISO has described trade dress as the "totality of elements in
which a product or service is packaged or presented."' 85
4. New IP Liability Coverages
Policyholders may also face significant coverage under specialized in-
surance policies being offered to cover IP-type claims. Such specialized
intellectual property policies are being offered that may provide insur-
ance coverage to defend or indemnify against techno tort claims. For ex-
ample, patent infringement liability policies are being sold that provide a
defense to both damages and injunctive actions for covered patent in-
fringement and may insure the cost of asserting counterclaims. To be
covered, the policyholder may be required to conduct an infringement
search and obtain an opinion of non-infringement from a patent attorney
before the inception of the policy or before the first use, manufacture, or
distribution of the infringing product. Moreover, intellectual property in-
fringement abatement policies are also now being offered that indemnify
policyholders for their legal fees and costs in suing to stop alleged in-
180. ISO, supra note 175.
181. For more information, see generally Lawrence Monin, ISO Advertising, supra note
175.
182. ISO, supra note 175.
183. See id.
184. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.] (1992).
185. See supra note 175.
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fringement of covered property. In addition, coverage also may be avail-
able for intellectual property liabilities outside of the advertising injury
context.
a. Potential E&O Coverage
Unlike CGL policies, error and omissions policies ("E&O") are not
based on standardized ISO forms; thus very little standardization of
forms exists. Assuming that the insured's activities qualify as "insured
services," the policy may respond to claims that the insured committed an
error or omission in the course of its activities. Some E&O carriers also
include coverage for errors or omissions that result in intellectual prop-
erty litigation, including copyright litigation. But there are very few re-
ported cases in this area involving E&O coverage claims.
Technology Errors and Omissions coverage, according to Loesch and
Brenner, also may be available to respond to claims for consequential
damages that result from error, omission, negligence, or breach of war-
ranty where there is no bodily injury or property damage. 186 Under such
coverage, losses must be caused by a "manufacturing or performance er-
ror." 87 Such errors are defined as errors or omissions in the "design,
manufacturing, labeling, packaging, distribution or instructions for use
of" the policyholder's work or manufactured product. 88 As Loesch and
Brenner note, "most technology errors and omissions polic[ies] exclude
personal injury and bodily injury claims. Losses based on physical injury
to tangible property will not be covered; they fall under the CGL rubric
• ..intellectual property violations are also not covered."' 89 Further-
more, "the world of electronic coding of information on disk drives, flop-
pies, and computer tape poses a substantial challenge to [the] old
concepts of 'tangible' and 'intangible' property.' 90 As matters [currently]
stand, courts have been hostile to coverage for pure data loss, but recep-
tive to any situation which ties the data to damage to [the] hardware in
some way."'191
b. Media Liability Policies
These policies are generally designed to protect publishers, broadcast-
ers, advertisers, and advertising agencies. Generally, these policies do
not provide coverage for errors or omissions in the course of the insured's
business. However, endorsements may be added that would provide cov-
erage for errors or omissions contained in the insured's published con-
tent. Moreover, coverage may also be provided for covered perils that








occur in the process of disseminating information via a company's web-
site, home page, or through the publication of online information.
c. D&O Policies
Coverage may exist for directors and officers ("D&O") if the company
is sued for allegedly violating a copyright or trade secret by posting
materials on the Internet. 192 Coverage issues may also arise if directors
or officers allegedly overstate revenue to be derived from patented prod-
ucts or approve business decisions that allegedly infringe on a competi-
tor's intellectual property portfolio.
d. Intellectual Property Policies
"Offensive" and "defensive" intellectual property policies have been
developed to protect the intellectual property rights of the insured. 193
Typically, "infringement abatement" policies cover 75-80% of the costs of
prosecuting an action to abate the infringement of the insured's intellec-
tual property and is designed to protect insureds who otherwise would
not have the financial capacity to bring such a suit to a conclusion. These
policies may also provide coverage in the event a counterclaim is asserted
against the insured.
Section I(A)(2) states that "the alleged INFRINGING acts complained
of must first begin during the policy period." 194 This raises the issue of
whether or not allegations of infringement would trigger coverage absent
a specific allegation that the alleged infringing acts occurred during the
policy period. Moreover, section I(B)(3) provides that coverage will be
afforded for the "LITIGATION EXPENSES incurred in defending any
declaratory judgment actions seeking to have an INSURED INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY declared invalid, but only if one more of the parties
seeking invalidity can also be charged with INFRINGEMENT of the IN-
SURED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY sought to mean validated."
Likewise, this raises several issues. First, how does a court determine
whether or not one or more of the parties seeking invalidity of the policy-
holder's intellectual property "can be charged" with infringement of that
intellectual property? Is the policyholder's subjective view that the plain-
tiff is infringing the policyholder's intellectual property conclusive on this
issue? Does the charge have to relate to the intellectual property at issue
in the lawsuit between the policyholder and the plaintiff or is it sufficient
for the charge to relate to the other intellectual property held by the
policyholder?
Several new policies have been issued by various entities. For example,
American International Specialty Insurance Company underwrites an
192. Fight Against Coercive Tactics Network, Inc. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1426
(D. Colo. 1996).
193. It should be noted that "offensive" or "infringement abatement" policies have not
been approved and may not be sold in New York.
194. The following material can be found at ISO, supra note 175.
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AIG patent infringement indemnity insurance policy. Intellectual Prop-
erty Insurance Services Corporation underwrites a patent defense reim-
bursement policy. Litigation Risk Management markets a Lloyd's of
London patent infringement pursuit coverage policy. Marsh & McClellan
market a "net secure" policy covering first and third-party losses that was
underwritten by a consortium of insurance companies including AIG,
Lloyd's, Zurich and Chubb. Insure Trust.com, an Atlanta-based program
manager for specialty E-business, offers electronic information and errors
and omissions liability policies for E- businesses, and is underwritten by
Philadelphia-based Legion Indemnity Company, a unit of Mutual Risk
Management, Ltd. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company offers a
media liability coverage policy with primary and excess limits. Reliance
National Insurance Company markets specialty-based E-commerce cov-
erage. AIG offers Internet related products and services. The Chubb
Group of Insurance Companies offers a "safety net Internet liability pol-
icy." Zurich Reinsurance offers an E-risk protection policy. Steadfast
Insurance Brokerage Company markets an information technology pro-
fessional liability policy. Finally, J.S. Wurzler Underwriting Managers
sells a "wisp" website breach security losses policy.195
To date, there are very few reported cases concerning the scope of cov-
erage provided by the new patent infringement abatement insurance poli-
cies offered by the market. In Plug-in Storage Systems v. Homestead Ins.
Co., 19 6 the court addressed the insured's claim that its insurer's claims
were time barred. The patent infringement abatement policy apparently
contained an arbitration clause and the insurance company filed a de-
mand for arbitration against the policyholder "claiming that it was enti-
tled to repayment of the litigation fees and costs paid on behalf of Plug-in
pursuant to the policies. Specifically, Homestead claimed that Plug-in's
misrepresentations rendered the policy contract void. ' 197 The court
agreed with the insurer's contention that its claims against the policy-
holder required a determination of the party's respective contractual du-
ties and obligations under the insurance policy, and rejected the
policyholder's assertion that the insurer's claims were barred by the three
year statute of limitations on tort claims under Connecticut law.198 Ac-
cording to the court, "[t]he instant case concerns the plaintiff's compli-
ance with [the] terms of contracting for insurance coverage. Accordingly,
contract law governs this action, and the defendant is not precluded fom
demanding arbitration by the statute of limitations for tort." 199
195. See id.
196. 81 F. Supp.2d 371 (D. Conn. 1999).
197. Id. at 372.




e. Excess and Umbrella Policies
A company with substantial liability exposure through its online activi-
ties should consider purchasing an excess or umbrella policy that provides
significant additional insurance protection. Such coverage would provide
insurance above the policyholder's primary limits and is generally a rela-
tively inexpensive means of increasing the limits of one's insurance cover-
age significantly.
f. First-Party Coverage
Insurance coverage is now being offered to cover lost data and network
downtime. For example, INSUREtrust.com provides "Internet/Network
Computer Liability Coverage" for coverage of claims arising out of a
"Network Computer Act," such as intrusion into a network or a "Mul-
timedia Act," or a claim for copyright and trademark infringement occur-
ring in the course of "Network Computer Activity. 1200 "Digital Asset
Protection" provides first-party coverage, which is applicable to: (1)
"Networked Computer Theft," such as loss of "money" or "securities";
(2) damage to networked assets (such as "corruption" of proprietary data
due to "unauthorized access" or "computer virus"); or (3) loss of "busi-
ness income" and "additional expense" from business disruption due to a
"denial of service attack," "unauthorized access," or "computer virus. '201
Likewise, "Network Extortion and Ransom" provides first-party cover-
age applicable to: (1) the wrongful takeover of a system; (2) the alteration
of passwords or security schemes causing loss of control of computer sys-
tem; (3) expenses resulting from extortion threats, including negotiators,
public relations consultants, loan interest, and fees to decrypt or replace
electronic data; and (4) rewards. 202 "Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Pol-
icies" include "Network Computer Liability Policies," "Digital Certificate
Warranty Liability Policies," and "Digital Certificate Management Liabil-
ity Policies. '203
5. Coverage for Losses Due to Network Downtime, Corruption or
Loss of Data, Hackers, and Other Types of Losses
Under Coverage "A" of the standard CGL policy, coverage is available
for "property damage," generally defined as "[p]hysical injury to tangible
property, including all resulting loss of use of that property" as well as
"[the] loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. ''2°4
However, it is an open question under Texas law whether or not the loss
of computer data would constitute "property damage" under a CGL pol-
icy. A second unresolved issue is whether or not the temporary inability





204. ISO, supra note 175.
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Court of Appeals has held that a computer tape, together with the infor-
mation contained on the tape, constitutes tangible property for insurance
coverage purposes under a CGL policy. 205 However, the same court,
later held that the data contained or stored on a computer tape is not
tangible property.206
Another important unresolved issue is whether or not software consti-
tutes a "product" for purposes of CGL policies that exclude liabilities
resulting from "your work" or "your product". For purposes of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.), software has been found to be both a
service and a good. Software is a service when it is custom designed and
installed for a unique use. But software is a good if it has been mass-
produced and distributed widely.207
In Seagate Technologies, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,208 the
court held that an umbrella liability insurer need not defend the maker of
allegedly defective computer parts because there was no covered "physi-
cal injury. '209 The plaintiff in the underlying action sought damages for
the failure of the insured's disk drive to perform as promised, but there
was no suggestion in the plaintiff's complaint that any damage resulted to
any other component from the alleged defects in the disk drives.2 10 Ac-
cording to the court, "[a]s a general matter, the risk of replacing or re-
pairing a defective product is considered a commercial risk which is not
passed on to a liability insurer .... This rule is designed to prevent liabil-
ity insurance from serving as a warranty or a guarantee of an insured's
product. '211 Moreover, the court concluded that it "must follow the rule
... that 'physical incorporation of a defective product into another does
not constitute property damage unless there is physical harm to the
whole.' "1212
6. Insurance Coverage Cases Relating to the Recovery of Y2K
Compliance Costs
Xerox, GTE, and Unisys and other policyholders have filed lawsuits
against their respective insurance carriers seeking to recover their past
and future Y2K compliance costs. 213
The policyholders contend their Y2K compliance costs are covered
under the "sue and labor" clauses of their respective property policies.
214
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These clauses generally provide as follows:
[I]n case of actual or imminent loss or damage by a peril insured
against, it shall without prejudice to this insurance, be lawful and
necessary for the insured to ... sue, labor, and travel, in and about
the defense, the safeguard, and the recovery of the property or any
part of the property insured.215
The policies generally require the carriers to "contribute to the ex-
penses so incurred according to the rate and quantity of the sum herein
insured." 216
GTE expects to spend $400 million in year 2000 compliance costs, ac-
cording to documents filed with the S.E.C.217 Xerox expects to spend
$183 million in 1999 on Y2K costs. 2 18 On July 15, 1999 a consortium of
thirty three property/casualty insurers and reinsurers held a round table
conference in Washington D.C. in reaction to the actions brought by
GTE, Xerox, and Unisys.219 The insurers raised three arguments against
such claims: (1) "remediation expenses are different from the types of
expenses that sue and labor clauses are intended to cover"; (2) the ex-
penses were not incurred for the primary purpose of benefiting the in-
surer but rather to meet industry standards, protect their company's
reputation, and maintain their market share; and (3) allowing such claims
would allegedly "transfer the ordinary business costs of remediating non-
compliant software to insurers and ultimately affect the reserves that in-
surers maintain to protect all policyholders. '220 The insurance coverage
battle concerning reimbursement of Y2K compliance costs have not been
resolved as of this writing.
7. Potential Coverage For Defamatory/Libelous Statements in Cyber-
Space
Coverage "B" provides coverage for damages the policyholder be-
comes legally obligated to pay because of "personal injury. '221 "Personal
injury" is defined to mean "injury, other than 'bodily injury'," arising out
of one or more of the following offenses:
a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment;
b. Malicious prosecution;
c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of
the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling, or premises
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d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a
person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's
goods, products, or services; or
e. Oral or written publication 222
An untested question in Texas is whether or not online service provid-
ers should be classified as publishers, distributors, or common carriers for
purposes of assigning liability for defamatory statements transmitted by
users of their services. In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,2 23 the court
held CompuServe to the standard of a distributor.224 The plaintiff sought
to hold CompuServe, a comprehensive service provider, liable for defam-
atory statements contained in a newsletter that CompuServe made availa-
ble on its electronic journalism forum. 225 An outside publisher was
responsible for supplying the newsletter to an independent company,
Cameron Communications, Inc., which decided to upload the newsletter
and include it in the forum.226 CompuServe did not review the contents
of the newsletter before it was made available to the subscribers. 22 7
The court found that CompuServe exercised virtually no editorial con-
trol of the content of statements transmitted by its system and therefore
classified it as a distributor.22 8 The court noted that "[w]hile Com-
puServe may decline to carry a given publication altogether, in reality,
once it does decide to carry a publication, it will have little or no editorial
control over that publication's contents. ' 229 Accordingly, CompuServe
could not be held liable for the defamatory statements contained in the
newsletter unless the plaintiff could show that it knew or should have
known of the statement's defamatory nature. 230
In contrast, the court in Stratton Oakmont., Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co.,231 classified Prodigy, a comprehensive service provider similar to
CompuServe, as a publisher for purposes of liability for defamatory state-
ments posted by users on Prodigy's "Money Talk" bulletin board. More-
over, the court found that Prodigy held itself out as exercising editorial
control over its network and thus did exert editorial control akin to a
newspaper publisher or a television network.232 In addition, the court
also focused on the following indicia of Prodigy's editorial control: (1) it
issued content guidelines that directed users to refrain from posting "in-
sulting" messages or messages that "harass other members or are deemed
to be in bad taste or grossly repugnant to community standards"; (2) it
used software designed automatically to screen all postings for offensive
222. See id.
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language; (3) it instituted "board leaders" to monitor its bulletin boards;
and (4) it enabled board leaders to delete undesirable messages by using
"an emergency delete function. '2 33 Thus, because Prodigy had taken
steps to sensor the material it transmitted, the court treated it as a
publisher.2 34
In response to the online service providers' concerns raised by the
Stratton Oakmont case, Congress included in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996235 a provision protecting "good samaritan" blocking and
screening of offensive material.236 According to the Act, "no provider or
publisher of an interactive computer service shall be treated a the pub-
lisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider. '237 Furthermore, "no provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable on account of-[... ] any action vol-
untarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material
that the provider or users considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected .... "238
As pointed out by Martin C. Loesch and David M. Brenner, 239 the ex-
ception of liability created by the Telecommunications Act is a narrow
one and leaves open the question of whether or not OSP's who exercise
control over the content of messages posted to a bulletin board may still
be held to the standard of publishers where the editorial control is not
undertaken for the purpose of restricting online access to obscenity and
other "objectionable material," but for other purposes, such as insuring
topicality.240 Accordingly, commentators have for the most part argued
against treating online service providers or bulletin board operators as
publishers.2 41 Rather, they have suggested that a plaintiff should be re-
quired to demonstrate that the provider or operator knew of the mate-
rial's defamatory character before imposing liability.242
8. Recovery of "Pre-tender" Investigation Costs
In Copart, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois,243 the court
awarded the policyholder prejudgment interest on its defense costs begin-
ning on the date the policyholder first incurred the payment obliga-
tions. 244 According to the court,
233. Id. at *3.
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Copart [was] entitled to prejudgment interest on the expenses it in-
curred in defending a copyright action that Travelers was obligated
to defend. Interest began to accrue on the date Copart incurred its
obligations (i.e., the billing dates). The court has reviewed the alter-
native methods by which the plaintiff has calculated this interest and
finds [the most reasonable method to be the calculation] that takes
into account the parties' compromise regarding actual damages.245
Moreover, the court distinguished between prejudgment interest
awarded in a coverage case from prejudgment interest awarded in a dam-
ages case by stating that : "the court further finds that the focus of this
lawsuit has been coverage, not [the] extent of damages.246 Esgro Central,
Inc. v. General Insurance Co.2 47 involved the alleged breach of insurance
contracts which insured stores damaged during the 1965 Watts Riots in
Los Angeles.248 Prejudgment interest was proper on damages awarded
under a fire insurance policy because the essential dispute was one of
coverage and the computation of the amount was a question of law (the
value of the property destroyed). 249 However, the court denied prejudg-
ment interest on the judgment entered based on a policy of business in-
terruption insurance.2 50 The issue in that cause of action was the extent of
the property owner's damage for losses admittedly covered.2 51 But the
dispute in this case is more analogous to the fire insurance claim in Esgro.
CONCLUSION
This article discusses only a few of the many untested insurance cover-
age questions in a complex and evolving area of the law. The Internet, e-
commerce, and technology are developing and changing at a rapid pace.
New insurance policies are being offered and being developed to enable
participants in the information economy to manage the inherent risks
that are present in a world of conflicting intellectual property rights and
changing economic systems. While traditional policies are being revised
in significant ways, the standard insurance policies were not designed to
address common IP risks of liability and often do not provide clear an-
swers to critical questions, such as: (1) whether or not a competitor's
claims for trademark or trade dress infringement are covered; (2)
whether or not a policyholder is entitled to be reimbursed for its reasona-
ble costs of preparing for Y2K events; (3) whether or not advertisements
or marketing of products that allegedly infringe upon a competitor's
products are activities that trigger a duty to defend a CGL policy; (4)
whether or not the loss of computer data constitutes a tangible injury to
property; and (5) whether or not network downtime or computer crashes
245. Id. at *3.
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and damages following from such events are covered by liability or first-
party insurance policies. Given the complexities of such insurance cover-
age issues to a developing area of insurance law, policyholders and insur-
ance carriers will need to proceed with an abundance of caution and
foresight.
